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The ever-increasing number and severity of cybersecurity breaches makes it vital to 
understand the factors that make organizations vulnerable. Since humans are 
considered the weakest link in the cybersecurity chain of an organization, this study 
evaluates users’ individual differences (demographic factors, risk-taking preferences, 
decision-making styles and personality traits) to understand online security behavior. 
This thesis studies four different yet tightly related online security behaviors that 
influence organizational cybersecurity: device securement, password generation, 
proactive awareness and updating. A survey (N=369) of students, faculty and staff in 
a large mid-Atlantic U.S. public university identifies individual characteristics that 
relate to online security behavior and characterizes the higher-risk individuals that 
pose threats to the university’s cybersecurity. Based on these findings and insights 
from interviews with phishing victims, the study concludes with recommendations to 
help similat organizations increase end-user cybersecurity compliance and mitigate 
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Cybercrime is a persistent problem, and the increase in the victimization of users in 
recent years is alarming (Interpol, 2015). A 2013 survey from the Pew Research 
Center reveals that 11% of Internet users have experienced theft of vital personal 
information, and 21% had an email or social networking account compromised 
(Rainie et al., 2013). The continual increase in the detection of information security 
compromise incidents emphasizes this unrelenting problem. PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PWC), in its annual Global State of Information Security Survey, reports an overall 
38% increase in detection of security incidents in 2015 from 2014 (PWC, 2015). The 
survey also noted that employees are the most-cited source of cybersecurity 
compromise in the organizations. 
 
Human vulnerability is widely accepted as a significant factor in 
cybersecurity. Recently, a Wall Street Journal story asserted that humans are the 
weakest link in the cybersecurity chain, and that this weakest link can be turned into 
the strongest security asset if the right actions are taken (Anschuetz, 2015). To 
understand how this weakest link, the user, could be turned into a strongest asset, it is 
important to examine the underlying factors that influence user cybersecurity 
behavior.  
 
There are broad categories of cybersecurity attacks ranging from money 
laundering to social engineering fraud (Interpol, 2015) that take advantage of the 
human vulnerabilities in cybersecurity. For example, social engineering frauds 
involve scams used by criminals to deceive the victims into giving out personally 
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identifiable information or financial information. Phishing is one of the most common 
kinds of cybersecurity attacks and is used as an example here (US-Cert, 2013). 
Phishing attacks use fake websites, emails or spam to lure and capture a person’s 
personal information. Phishers take advantage of the Internet and its anonymity to 
commit a diverse range of criminal activities. The types of phishing attacks are 
evolving over time and the Anti-Phishing Working Group, a coalition unifying the 
global response to cybercrime across industries, states in their latest report that as 
many as 173,262 unique phishing reports have been submitted in the fourth quarter of 
2015 (Anti-Phishing Working Group, 2016). These attacks are particularly sensitive 
to human reactions because for an attack to be successful, the human target must fall 
for the deception. Hence, it is very important to study and understand human behavior 
to reduce the damages of phishing and similar cybersecurity attacks. 
 
Falling for cybersecurity attacks such as phishing involves a user deciding to 
click on a link or reply to an email; hence, understanding technology-based decision-
making processes should help understand why individuals fall victim to phishing 
scams and similar cybersecurity attacks. Psychology researchers have studied how 
individual differences affect decision-making, and specifically how a particular 
behavior is correlated with individuals’ attitudes towards risk (Appelt et al., 2011). If 
some individual factors are also predictive of user security behavior, then those 
factors can be emphasized to customize security training and to improve outcomes. 
 
However, studying and analyzing human behavior that poses a threat to the 
organization’s cybersecurity in real-world situations is challenging, since most 
organizations do not make data about their cybersecurity attacks and compromises 
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publicly available. This study represents a unique opportunity to conduct research into 
the population of a large public university in the mid-Atlantic region of the United 
States that has been a repeated object of phishing attacks, and understand the various 
factors that could impact decision-making and user security behavior.  
 
The overarching research question that drives this study is, “What are the 
factors that influence users’ online security behavior?” The user security behaviors 
related to online security such as securing devices, generating good passwords and 
updating them, being proactively aware of cybersecurity threats and keeping software 
up-to-date are examined in this thesis. Relationships between the individual 
differences in users (risk-taking preferences, decision-making styles, personality 
traits, and demographics) and these online security behaviors are explored. Users’ 
falling for phishing is one of the top concerns for the university studied, and hence a 
group of identified phishing victims are studied to gain insights into the factors that 
may have influenced their victimization. 
 
This study moves beyond existing literature on user online security behavior 
and individual differences by including personality traits and university-level 
demographic factors that have not been previously investigated. While we studied 
online security behaviors applicable to general users’ online behaviors (which 
includes personal devices too), such behavior relates to organizational cybersecurity 
because of the connectivity of devices in today’s world and the freedom of connecting 
personal devices to an organization’s network. For example, practices like BYOD 
(Bring Your Own Device) at work enables employees to use their personal devices in 
the organization. With such interconnectivity of devices, users’ online security 
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behaviors will impact organizational cybersecurity.This study, based on the findings 
from the relationships between individual differences and online security behaviors, 
and insights from interviews with identified phishing victims, makes 
recommendations that can be adopted in similar organizations to create better security 






2. Literature Review 
This section begins with explaining the online user security behaviors that are 
examined in this study: securing devices, generating good passwords and updating 
them, being proactive aware of cybersecurity threats and keeping software up-to-date. 
It further describes the individual differences in risk-taking preferences, decision-
making styles, personality traits and demographics. Since the exploration of how 
these individual differences in terms of psychometrics correlate with security attitudes 
and behaviors has only very recently begun (Egelman et al., 2015), this thesis draws 
heavily on the phishing literature as it is the best developed research stream on 
behavioral decision-making and cybersecurity addressing the human element. 
Therefore, inferences are drawn from the phishing literature on the personality traits, 
decision-making styles, risk-taking preferences and demographics to build the 
research model linking individual differences to online security behaviors. 
 
2.1. User Security Behavior 
There are three broad categories of user behaviors that are related to security 
behavior: Risk-averse behavior, naive or accidental behavior, and risk-inclined 
behavior (Stanton et al., 2005). For example, leaving a computer unattended or 
accessing dubious websites can be categorized as naive behavior, while always 
logging off the computer when unattended or changing passwords regularly can be 
categorized as risk-averse behavior (Pattinson and Anderson, 2007). Risk-inclined or 
deliberate behavior would include behaviors such as hacking into other people’s 




The subset of user security behaviors considered in this study – securing 
devices, generating good passwords and updating them, being proactive aware of 
cybersecurity threats and keeping software up-to-date – fall under the categories of 
risk-averse and naive behavior.  
   
Vendors include features in many of their devices that allow them to be 
“locked” making them unusable without a PIN or password. Often these features must 
be enabled by the user. Enabling these features increases the users’ online 
cybersecurity. Device Securement corresponds to such behaviors as locking one’s 
computer and mobile device screens or using a PIN or password to lock one’s devices 
(Egelman et al., 2015).  
 
Online account vendors emphasize the importance of generating strong 
passwords and updating passwords regularly to ensure security of the accounts. Most 
vendors encourage creation of strong passwords by  mandating the usage of at least 
one special character, or by forcing alpha-numeric usage in the passwords. Password 
Generation in this study refers to the practices of choosing strong passwords, not 
reusing passwords between different accounts, and changing passwords (Egelman et 
al., 2015). 
  
With the exponential growth of cyber threats, creating and promoting 
awareness of these threats is a key agenda for organizations world-wide (PWC, 2015). 
For example, in phishing attacks, the victimization involves a user’s decision to click 
on a spurious link and falling victim to the attack. Proactive Awareness indicates the 
users paying attention to contextual clues such as the URL bar or other browser 
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indicators in websites or email messages, exhibiting caution when submitting 
information to websites and being proactive in reporting security incidents (Egelman 
et al., 2015). 
 
Software vendors often provide customers with security patches and updates 
to keep their systems from being less vulnerable to cyber attacks. In most of these 
updates, a user must make the decision of choosing to update when prompted. 
Applying these patches and updates enables higher online cybersecurity. Updating 
measures the extent to which someone consistently applies security patches or 
otherwise keeps their software up-to-date (Egelman et al., 2015).  
  
 Examining and understanding the factors that influence these online security 
behaviors of device securement, password generation, proactive awareness and 
updating will enable identification of organizational IT users who may be creating 
vulnerabilities that can be exploited. As shown in Figure 1, there are many factors that 
influence user security behavior. Since the aim of this thesis is to understand the end-
user cybersecurity behavior and not the overall organizational security, the focus is on 






Figure 1: The factors that influence user security behavior (taken from Leach, 2003) 
 
2.2. Decision-Making 
Decision-making and user behavior that relate to general cybersecurity have been 
most extensively studied in connection with decision strategies and 
perceived/observed susceptibility to phishing (Ng et al., 2009; Leach, 2003). So we 
draw on this literature to guide hypothesis development. Understanding the individual 
differences in users that affect their decision to perform a security behavior will 
enable customization of security training to improve outcomes (Blythe et al., 2011).  
The Decision-making Individual Differences Inventory (DIDI) lists an extensive set 
of individual differences measures of risk attitudes and behavior, decision styles, 
personality traits, etc. (Appelt et al., 2011). Three sets of individual differences or 
psychometrics from DIDI – risk-taking preferences, decision-making styles and 
personality traits – are studied extensively in relation to phishing. The following 





2.3. Risk-taking Preferences 
Risk-taking is a measure of risk attitude and shapes decision-making, which is 
examined in the literature in relation to several forms of risky behavior (Arnett, 1996). 
In a study evaluating risk-taking behaviors, Charness et al., (2013) found that risk-
taking attitudes correlated with self-reported risky behavior (e.g., gambling and drug 
use), impulsivity, and sensitivity. Sensation seeking, dangerous driving habits, and 
risky sexual behavior are a few of the forms of risky behavior identified in relation to 
risk-taking.  
 
In relation to online security behaviors, five dimensions of risk-taking 
preferences have been studied: ethical, financial, health or safety, recreational, and 
social. A study of the associations between risk-taking attitudes and security behavior 
found that willingness to take health/safety risks is inversely correlated with having 
proactive security awareness (Egelman et al., 2015). While this study establishes a 
relation between health/safety risk-taking and online security, another study shows 
that the five dimensions of risk-taking do not significantly correlate with 
susceptibility to phishing (one of the most common forms of cybersecurity breaches 
that rely on user decision-making)  (Sheng et al., 2010).  
 
Furthermore, literature on risk awareness and phishing suggest that 
susceptibility to phishing is not due to lack of awareness of the phishing risks and that 
real-time response to phishing is hard to predict in advance by online users (Halevi et 
al., 2013). Downs et al. (2007) concluded that awareness of risk is not a useful 
strategy in identifying phishing emails; this contradicts Egelman et al.’s (2016) 
findings that higher proactive awareness correlates positively with correctly 
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identifiying a phishing website. Downs et al., (2007) also suggest that people manage 
risks they are most familiar with, but do not appear wary of unfamiliar risks. A two-
stage experiment through a spear-phishing attack technique revealed that cyber-risk 
aware people surprisingly tend to fall for phishing more. Hence there is contradictory 
evidence in the literature that links risk-taking and awareness of risks with 
cybersecurity victimization. 
 
2.4. Decision-Making Styles 
Decision-making styles are the response patterns exhibited by an individual in a 
decision-making situation (Thunholm, 2004). Decision-making styles are generally 
categorized into five broad categories: rational, avoidant, dependent, intuitive, and 
spontaneous. The rational decision-making style can be briefly explained as using 
logic when making decisions. Avoidant refers to delaying decision-making. Outcome 
defines the style in which decisions are made by looking to others. Intuitive style 
includes making decisions based on instincts. Spontaneous style describes making 
quick decisions (John et al., 2008).  
 
Decision-making styles appear to be an important factor in determining user 
online security behavior. There is little literature on the relations between decision-
making style and user security behavior. One study exploring the relationship 
between these decision-making styles and security behaviors found that users who are 
less avoidant in decision-making style tend to have better security practices (Egelman 
et al., 2015). The study also suggests that people scoring low on dependent style 
scored high on awareness of security behavior. There were also significant 
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correlations found between rational and spontaneous decision-making styles and 
security behaviors (Egelman et al., 2015).  
2.5. Personality Traits 
Personality traits are another important factor that is extensively studied in the 
literature in connection with decision-making. Since, to the best of our knowledge, 
there are no studies that have examined relationships between personality traits and 
online security behaviors, we draw on the literature of personality and phishing. The 
following paragraphs explain the findings from the literature on relationships between 
personality and phishing. 
 
 The personality traits that have been studied extensively in predicting how 
users respond to phishing emails are: Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, 
Openness, and Extraversion; these are generally referred to as Big Five personality 
factors and are widely accepted in the literature to be stable personality traits (John et 
al., 2008). Agreeableness is a measure of the quality of the relationships a person has 
with others. Conscientiousness comprises self-discipline, dutiful action, and a respect 
for standards and procedures. Neuroticism relates to characterisitics of anxiety, fear, 
anger, etc. Openness is the desire to seek out new experiences without anxiety and an 
appreciation of different ideas and beliefs. Extraversion is the tendency to seek out the 
company of others and reflects energy and positive emotions in one’s personality 
(John et al., 2008). 
 
Few studies have examined the relationship between personality factors and 
user online security behaviors that pose cyber risk to organizations, among them, 
there is no consensus in findings. One study found that women victims of a phishing 
12 
 
experiment were high on the neuroticism factor, while no significant correlation with 
men and neuroticism rating was found (Halevi et al., 2013). It was also found that 
people who score high on the openness factor tend to both post more information on 
Facebook as well as have more open privacy settings, which may make them more 
susceptible to attacks. On the contrary, another study found high openness and 
extraversion were related to decreased phishing susceptibility (Pattinson et al., 2012). 
This contradiction is puzzling, as it would seem that individuals who are generally 
extraverted and open to new experiences might be more likely to trust inauthentic 
emails.  
 
Risk-avoidance is another personality trait in the decision-making individual 
differences inventory (Appelt et al., 2011). Although there are studies that looked at 
home computer user security awareness in avoiding phishing threats (Arachchilage et 
al., 2014), risk-avoidance as a personality trait is not studied in relation to other online 
security behaviors, but may be relevant. 
 
From the above studies, it is evident that there is contradictory evidence, and 
the studies lack generalizability of factors that relate to online security behavior with 
risk-taking preferences, decision-making styles and personality traits. In addition, 
there is an essential need to leverage such knowledge at the university level and to 





2.6. Demographic Factors 
This section describes findings from previous research on the relationships between 
demographic factors and online security behavior. 
 
Regarding password habits and management, findings from Shay et al. (2010) 
suggest that women are significantly more likely to reuse passwords than men. Also, 
individuals in the age group 18-24 are more likely to reuse passwords than individuals 
from any other age group with the majority of them admitting to reusing passwords 
across multiple sites. Further, we look at findings from the literature on relationships 
between demographics and phishing susceptibilities to build on the research model for 
studying demographics in relation to online security behaviors. 
 
Studies on demographics and phishing susceptibility show that susceptibility 
to phishing attacks varies mainly with people’s age and gender. A 2010 study that 
analyzed the demographics in relation to phishing susceptibility found that individuals 
in the 18-25 age group were most vulnerable to phishing attacks (Sheng et al., 2010). 
Parrish et al. (2009) also found that younger people, specifically college students, are 
more susceptible to phishing due to having lesser prior negative experience with 
online scams. A large-scale phishing attack study of 10,917 members of a university 
contradicts earlier findings of linear predictability of susceptibility with age and 
suggesting that the user demographics, age and gender are not conclusive alone in 
predicting users’ susceptibility to phishing attacks (Mohebzada et al., 2012). With 
regards to educational background, earlier research has found liberal arts students to 
be more vulnerable to phishing attacks than technology and science students (Darwish 




 In summary, the literature reviewed on risk-taking preferences suggests that 
health/safety risks correlated with weaker security behaviors. This thesis however 
looks at the remaining domains of risk-taking: ethical, financial, recreational and 
social to explore relationships with online security behaviors. . Avoidant and 
dependent decision-making styles correlated with weaker online security behaviors. 
In this thesis, the other three styles of decision-making, rational, intuitive and 
spontaneous which have not been previously studied are included because these styles 
have been found to impact phishing susceptibilities, and may be relevant in predicting 
online security behaviors. The personality traits of extraversion, conscientiousness, 
neuroticism, and openness are again found to be important in predicting phishing 
susceptibilities. Hence, in this thesis, the above traits will be examined for their 
relationship with online security behaviors. In addition, this study will also explore 
the personality traits of agreeableness and risk-avoidance. 
 
There are a number of demographic factors associated with phishing 
susceptibilities and password management. Younger people have been found to be 
more prone to fall for phishing and are more likely to have bad password habits 
including password reuse. There is contradictory evidence regarding the relation of 
gender to security behaviors. The majority of the evidence has found that women 
were more likely to have weaker security behaviors. Educational background may 
also matter, as those in more technical tracks gain valuable experience related to 
online security compared with those in the arts and humanities. These findings will be 
extended by studying the risk-taking preferences, decision-making styles and 
personality traits to four security behaviors of device securement, password 
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generation, proactive awareness and updating. In addition, this study will include 
demographics of citizenship, and employment length, and test for differences between 
student and faculty/staff status.  
16 
 
3. Research Model and Hypothesis 
In order to better understand the individual differences that influence users’ online 
security behaviors, quantitative data was collected from a survey distributed to a 
random sample of email account holders at a large public university in the mid-
Atlantic United States, and qualitative data was collected from interviews with a 
sample of phishing victims in the university. The primary focus of quantitative data 
collection was to understand the individual differences of decision-making (risk-
taking preferences, decision-making styles, personality traits, demographics) and their 
relationship to the online security behaviors of the individual (university students, 
faculty, staff). The qualitative data collection was aimed at identifying strategies or 
changes that can be employed to achieve effective security messaging. The findings 
from the quantitative and qualitative data analysis are used to make recommendations 
for security messaging that can result in greater compliance with policies and improve 
overall organizational cybersecurity. 
 
3.1. Thesis statement 
Identifying individual differences in users that influence their decision-making and 
security behavior will enable us to propose better security messaging strategies to 
achieve higher organizational security. 
 
3.2. Research Questions 
Over-training those who are naturally good at maintaining online cybersecurity may 
cause annoyance, while under-training those who are poor at such a task can be 
disastrous. Understanding the factors that lead to such differences would enable 
17 
 
development of better awareness and training tools catering to the diverse user needs. 
The overarching research questions that guide this study are: 
 
1. What individual differences in users (risk-taking preferences, decision-making 
styles, personality traits and demographic factors) uniquely influence their 
online security behavior? 
 
2. Do users’ online security behaviors vary across specific demographic factors? 
 
3.3. Research Model 
Figure 2 below depicts the research model that is tested in this thesis. Predictor 
variables are divided into four broad categories: Risk-Taking preferences (Ethical, 
Financial, Health/Safety, Recreational, Social), Decision-Making styles (Rational, 
Intuitive, Outcome, Avoidant, Spontaneous), Personality traits (Agreeableness, 
Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, Openness, Extraversion, Risk-Avoidance), and 
Demographic factors (Age, Gender, Role, Major, Citizenship, Employment Length). 
 














Drawing on the extant literature described avove, the following set of hypotheses are 
tested in this study.  
 
The background research shows relations between ethical, health/safety and 
social risk-taking to security behaviors. In this study, financial and recreational risk-
taking will also be explored for associations with users’ online security behavior. In 
general, this study posits that people who have high risk-taking preferences in the 
above five domains will have weaker online security behaviors. In the following set 
of hypotheses, online security behaviors include device securement, password 
generation, proactive awareness, and updating. 
 
H1: Users’ willingness to take risks will significantly correlate with their online 
security behaviors. 
H1a: Users who are more willing to take ethical risks will likely have weaker 
security behaviors than those not willing to take such risks. 
 
H1b: Users who are more willing to take financial risks will likely have 
weaker security behaviors than those not willing to take such risks. 
 
H1c: Users who are more willing to take health/safety risks will likely have 
weaker security behaviors than those not willing to take such risks. 
 
H1d: Users who are more willing to take recreational risks will likely have 




H1e: Users who are more willing to take social risks will likely have weaker 
security behaviors than those not willing to take such risks. 
 
Previous research shows relations between rational, dependent, avoidant and 
spontaneous decision-making styles, and online security behavior. In this study, we 
will also explore intuitive decision-making style for associations with users’ online 
security behavior.  
 
H2: Users’ decision-making styles will significantly correlate with their online 
security behaviors.  
H2a: Users who score low on rational decision-making style will more likely 
have weaker security behaviors than those who score high on such style. 
 
H2b: Users who score high on intuitive decision-making style will more likely 
have weaker security behaviors than those who score low on such style. 
 
H2c: Users who score high on dependent decision-making style will more 
likely have weaker security behaviors than those who score high on such style. 
 
H2d: Users who score high on avoidant decision-making style will more likely 
have weaker security behaviors than those who score low on such style. 
 
H2e: Users who score high on spontaneous decision-making style will more 




Previous  research shows relations between neuroticism, openness, extraversion and 
phishing susceptibility. In this study, conscientiousness, agreeableness and risk-
avoidance personality traits will also be explored for associations with users’ online 
security behaviors.  
 
H3: Users’ personality traits will significantly correlate with their online security 
behaviors. 
H3a: Users with higher agreeableness will be less likely to have weaker 
security behaviors. 
 
H3b: Users with higher conscientiousness will be less likely to have weaker 
security behaviors. 
 
H3c: Users with higher neuroticism will be more likely to have weaker 
security behaviors. 
 
H3d: Users with higher openness will be more likely to have weaker security 
behaviors. 
 
H3e: Users with higher extraversion will be less likely to have weaker security 
behaviors. 
 





Previous research shows relations between demographic differences in age, gender 
and educational background, and, phishing susceptibility and security behavior. In 
this study, we will also explore demographic factors including role, citizenship and 
employment length for associations with online security behaviors.  
 
H4: Users’ demographics will significantly correlate with their online security 
behaviors. 
H4a: Younger users will have weaker security behaviors than older users. 
 
H4b: Female users will have weaker security behaviors than male users. 
 
H4c: Students will have weaker security behaviors than faculty/staff. 
 
H4d: Students pursuing rngineering and technical majors will have stronger 
security behaviors than those pursuing non-technical majors. 
 
H4e: U.S. Citizens will have stronger security behaviors than non-U.S. 
Citizens. 
 
H4f: User’s who have been employed at the university for a longer time will 




To address the research questions and inform recommendations on security 
messaging, the following data collection activities have been performed: 
 
• A random sample of 4000 students, staff, and faculty were invited to take an 
online survey on users’ risk-taking preferences, decision-making styles, 
personality traits and online security behaviors. 
• The survey invitation was also emailed to a second sample of 304 phishing 
victims identified from historical data obtained through the university. 
• Demographic factors of age, gender, role, major, citizenship, and employment 
length with the university were obtained from the campus human resources 
and registrar units. 
• Interviews were conducted with seven victims of a prior phishing attack from 
the university to discuss their cybersecurity awareness and identify strategies 
or changes that could inform security messaging to achieve greater 
cybersecurity compliance. 
 
See Appendix A for the survey instrument and Appendix B for the interview protocol. 
 
4.1. Procedures 
The following sections explain the procedures that have been utilized during the 





Institutional Review Board (IRB) approvals were received for the developed survey 
instrument. Participants were invited by email and were directed to an online survey 
hosted on the Qualtrics platform. They were given a consent form with details of the 
study explained in the standard IRB format. If they agreed to participate, they were 
taken to the survey, where there were a set of questions on their risk-taking 
preferences, decision-making styles, personality traits, demographics, and online 
security behaviors. The questions were not mandatory and hence the participants 
could skip questions that they did not want to answer. The total time taken for 
completion of the survey ranged from 12-20 minutes.  
 
The survey was kept active for a three-week period with two intermediate 
email reminders sent. At the close of the survey, a total of 385 complete responses 
and 150 partially complete responses were obtained. The partial responses had very 
minimal information and hence were discarded from the analysis. The 385 responses 
from the survey were cleaned for inconsistencies and missing values, producing 369 
responses that could be analyzed, consisting of 348 responses from the random 
sample and 21 responses from the known phishing victims sample.  
 
4.1.2. Interviews 
IRB approval was received for the developed interview protocol. A total of 185 
interview invitations were sent via email from the historical data on phishing victims. 
The interview invitations were followed up with reminder requests to participate in 
the study. Seven interviews with phishing victims were conducted and audio-
recorded. Interviews were conducted face-to-face and, on average, lasted about 45 
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minutes. The interviews included questions about each participant’s recall of the 
incident, risk awareness, computer and Internet security practices, and insights into 
what could be effective cybersecurity education. The interviewers maintained 
observation forms to note the key points and themes from the interviews. The 
interviews were transcribed through a third-party service. Due to the low response 
rate and diversity in the participants’ victimization experiences, theory building was 
not appropriate for this scenario. Hence, descriptive open content coding was used to 
identify the issues, gain insights into what could have helped the victims, and thereby 
propose possible solutions.  
 
4.2. Measures 
The following section discusses the measures that were used for data collection in the 
surveys and interviews. 
 
4.2.1. Surveys 
The measures and coding schemes of the predictor and outcomes variables in the 
research model are presented in the following sub-sections. 
 
4.2.1.1. Predictor Variables 
There are four sets of predictor variables: risk-taking preferences (ethical, financial, 
health/safety, recreational, social), decision-making styles (rational, intuitive, 
dependent, avoidant, spontaneous), personality traits (agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, neuroticism, openness, extraversion, risk-avoidance) and 
demographics (age, gender, role, major for students only, citizenship, employment 





The Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) inventory was used to measure 
ethical, financial, health and safety, recreational, and social risk-taking (Appelt et al., 
2011). The DOSPERT scale is a psychometric scale designed to assess risk-taking 
preferences through self-reporting in the above five domains. It is a 30-item 
assessment with 5 sub-scales for five domains using a 7- point Likert scale ranging 
from ‘Very Unlikely’ to ‘Very Likely’. Each sub-scale has six individual questions 
and the sub-scale composite score is computed by averaging the six individual 
question scores.  Hence, the five continuous variables were computed with scores 
ranging from 1 to 7. 
 
Decision-Making styles 
The General Decision Making Style (GDMS) questionnaire was used to measure 
rational, intuitive, dependent, avoidant and spontaneous decision-making styles 
(Appelt et al., 2011). GMDS is a widely used scale in the literature designed to assess 
how individuals approach decision situations. It is a 25-item scale with 5 sub-scales 
using 5- point Likert ratings from ‘Strongly Disagree’ to ‘Strongly Agree.’ Each sub-
scale has five individual questions and the sub-scale composite score is computed by 
averaging the five individual question scores.  Hence, the five continuous variables 
were computed with scores ranging from 1 to 5. 
 
Personality Traits 
The International Personality Item Pool (IPIP) has an inventory of scales that can be 
used to measure personality traits. The IPIP 10-item scales of neo-five domains were 
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used to measure agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, openness, and 
extraversion, and and Tellegen’s multi-dimensional personality questionnaire of harm 
avoidance was used to measure risk-avoidance (Appelt et al., 2011). Each of the 
personality traits considered in our research model has  positive-keyed questions and 
reverse-keyed questions, totaling to form a 60-item scale with 5-point ratings ranging 
from ‘Very Inaccurate’ to ‘Very Accurate.’ 
 
Reverse-keyed questions were recoded by subtracting the question scores from 
6 (e.g. 5 rating on a reverse-keyed question was converted to 1 rating (6 minus 5), 4 
rating to a 2 rating (6 minus 4)). Averaging was used on recoded variable ratings for 
reverse-keyed questions and ratings for positive-keyed questions to create composite 
scores for each of the four outcomes. Hence, the six continuous variables were 
computed with scores ranging from 1 to 5.  
 
Demographic factors 
The demographics factors considered in the study include age, gender, role, major, 
citizenship, and employment length. The above variables were coded into simple 
categorical variables for ANOVA analysis, and were retained as continuous for 
multiple regression analysis. 
 
Age was divided into six groups: 
• Group 1: 18-25 years 
• Group 2: 26-35 years 
• Group 3: 36-45 years 
• Group 4: 46-55 years 
• Group 5: 56-65 years 
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• Group 6: 65+ years  
Gender was retained as male and female. 
 
Role in the university is broadly divided into two groups, students and faculty/staff. 
 
Specific Major initially was considered as the variable, but due to too many variations 
and an unequal spread of responses, the responses for subgroup of students were 
broadly categorized into four categories of colleges/majors: 
 
• Group 1: University students majoring in Humanities  
• Group 2: University students majoring in Business  
• Group 3: University students majoring in Behavioral sciences  
• Group 4: University students majoring in Engineering  
 
Citizenship is broadly categorized into two categories, ‘U.S. Citizen’ and ‘Non-U.S. 
Citizen’. 
 
Employment length was considered only for the subgroup of faculty/staff and 
represents the number of years since their original hire date in the university. The 
responses were categorized into four broad categories: 
 
Group 1: 0-5 years 
Group 2: 6-10 years 
Group 3: 11-20 years 
Group 4: 20+ years 
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4.2.1.2. Outcome Variables 
 
There are four outcome variables in the model: device securement, password 
generation, proactive awareness and updating.  
 
Online Security Behaviors 
This set of variables measures online security behaviors toward securing devices, 
creating and reusing passwords, having proactive awareness, and keeping software 
up-to-date. The Security Behavior Intention Scale (SeBIS) (Egelman et al., 2015) 
used for measuring the users’ security behavior is a 16-item scale with four subscales 
consisting of questions with 5-point ratings ranging from ‘Never’ to ‘Always’, to 
obtain self-reported data on users’ online security behaviors. 
 
SeBIS has reverse-keyed questions which were recoded by subtracting the 
question scores from 6 (e.g. 5 rating on a reverse-keyed question was converted to 1 
rating (6 -5), 4 rating to a 2 rating (6-4)). Averaging was used on recoded variable 
ratings for reverse-keyed questions and ratings for positive-keyed questions to create 
composite scores for each of the four outcomes. Hence, the four outcomes had scores 
ranging from 1 to 5.  
 
Any respondent with missing data on an outcome measure was dropped from 
the analysis. The SeBIS scale is a relatively new scale and hence we performed a 




4.3. Data Analysis 
A correlation analysis was performed on all the variables in the model to evaluate the 
data for multi-collinearity issues. For variables that appeared similar, weaker 
variables were dropped from the analysis. For example, the variable recreational risk-
taking was highly correlated with risk-avoidance. Due to high collinearity (r=-0.769, 
p<0.01), recreational risk-taking was dropped from the analysis. 
 
Factor analysis was performed on the SeBIS scale as it is a relatively new 
scale. Reliability testing was performed on all four of the scales that were used in the 
analysis. All of the scales showed moderate to excellent reliability (see section 5.1). 
 
To answer research question 1, step-wise multiple regressions were run for 
each of the four outcome variables. Each step contained a group of predictor variables 
based on the research model (risk-taking preferences, decision-making styles, 
personality traits and demographics) to compute the unique variance in the outcome 
variables attributable to each group of predictor variables. 
 
To answer research question 2, predictor variables from the demographic 
factors were tested against the four outcome variables using ANOVA along with post-
hoc analysis to look for differences in outcome variables for various groups of 
predictor variables. 
 
Finally, non-response analysis was performed to test for non-response bias. 
Response and non-response demographic samples were compared to test for statistical 




Below are the results based on the 369 valid responses. Findings and results from the 
hypothesis testing are presented in the following sections. 
 
5.1. Factor Analysis and Reliability Testing 
Principal component analysis with varimax rotation was performed on the SeBIS to 
verify the factor loadings onto the four sub-scales of SeBIS. Table 1 shows the factor 












When I'm prompted for a software 
update, I install it right away.  
 
 0.78 
I try to make sure the programs I 
use are up to date.   0.826 
I manually lock my computer 
screen when I step away from it. 0.375 0.333  0.39 
I set my computer screen to 
automatically lock if I don’t use it 
for a prolonged period of time. 0.725   
I use a PIN or passcode to unlock 
my mobile phone. 0.682   
I use a password/passcode to 
unlock my laptop or tablet. 0.748 
 
  
If I discover a security problem, I 
continue what I was doing because 
I assume someone else will fix it.  0.686  
When someone sends me a link, I 
open it without first verifying 
where it goes.  0.793  
I verify that my antivirus software 
has been regularly updating itself.  
 
 0.731 
When browsing websites, I mouse 
over links to see where they go, 
before clicking them.  -0.368 0.439 
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I know what website I’m visiting 
based on its look and feel, rather 
than by looking at the URL bar.  
 
0.701  
I do not change my passwords, 
unless I have to.  -0.606   
I use different passwords for 
different accounts that I have.  0.587   
I do not include special characters 
in my password if it’s not required.  -0.694   
When I create a new online 
account, I try to use a password that 
goes beyond the site’s minimum 
requirements.  0.722   
I submit information to websites 
without first verifying that it will be 
sent securely (e.g., SSL, “https://”, 
a lock icon).  -0.357 0.562  
Eigen Values 1.156 1.556 1.972 3.785 
Percentage of variance 11.07% 13.09% 13.8% 14.97% 
Total variance 52.93% 
 Note: Factor loadings <0.3 are suppressed 
 
An overall moderate internal consistency was obtained for all the four outcome 
variables with Cronbach’s alphas (α = 0.604) for SeBIS_DeviceSecurement, (α = 
0.646) for SeBIS_PasswordGeneration, (α = 0.675) for SeBIS_ProactiveAwareness 
and (α = 0.749) for SeBIS_Updating subscales, with N=369. 
 
 Internal consistencies were also evaluated for all the predictor variable scales. 
Responses on all the predictor variable scales had moderate to excellent internal 
consistency: DOSPERT_Ethical (α = 0.802), DOSPERT_Financial (α =0.767), 
DOSPERT_Health/Safety (α = 0.748), DOSPERT_Social (α =0.624), 
GDMS_Rational (α = 0.767), GDMS_Intuitive (α = 0.78), GDMS_Dependent (α = 
0.759), GDMS_Avoidant (α =0.91), GDMS_Spontaneous (α = 0.859), 
IPIP_Agreeableness (α = 0.804), IPIP_Conscientiousness (α = 0.857), 
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IPIP_Neuroticism (α = 0.873), IPIP_Openness (α = 0.803), IPIP_Extraversion (α = 
0.868), IPIP_Risk-Avoidance (α = 0.89). 
 
5.2. Descriptives 
The survey sample includes students and faculty/staff from diverse roles, majors and 
employment duration but with less diverse age and citizenship. The majority of the 
sample is in the age group of 18-25 and are U.S. citizens. These will be considered 
when interpreting the results. Demographic data distribution of the sample is 
presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Demographic Data (N=369) 
Demographic Factors Mean SD Groups Percentages 

















Behavioral Sciences 29.1% 
Engineering 37.2% 
Citizenship 
U.S. Citizen 90.1% 
Non U.S. Citizen 9.9% 
Employment Length (For 
faculty/staff, n=122) 
  
0-5 yrs 40.2% 
6-10 yrs 15.4% 
11-20 yrs 25.6% 




Appendix D presents the means and standard deviations for all predictor and outcome 
variables. Step-wise multiple regression analysis is performed on the sets of predictor 
variables and outcome variables to test the hypotheses. 
 
5.3. Multiple Regression Analysis 
Multiple regression analysis was coducted with predictor variables, risk-taking 
preferences, decision-making styles, personality traits and demographics on the four 
outcome variables of online security behaviors, device securement, password 
generation, proactive awareness and updating. Only demographic factors of age, 
gender, role and citizenship are included in the regression model as major and 
employment length do not apply to the entire sample. Major is relevant only to the 
sub-sample of students and employment length only to the sub-sample of 
faculty/staff. The results are organized by outcome variable. 
 
5.3.1. Device Securement 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions were run on device securement as the 
outcome variable and risk-taking preferences, decision-making styles, personality 
traits and demographics as the predictor variables. Table 3 lists the standardized and 
unstandardized betas along with standard errors for the regression model.   
 
There was no significant unique effect of any single kind of risk-taking 
preferences on users’ security behavior of device securement. In decision-making 
styles, rational decision-making style (β=0.164, p<0.01)  was a significant unique 
predictor. In personality traits, extraversion (β=0.142, p<0.05) was found to be a 
significant unique predictor.  There was no significant unique effect of any 
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demographic factor on users’ security behavior of device securement. Therefore, 
Hypothesis H1 (hypothesizing influence of risk-taking preferences on device 
securement) is not supported. Hypothesis H2a (hypothesizing the influence of rational 
decision-making style) is supported while the remaining H2 hypotheses are not 
supported. Hypothesis H3e (hypothesizing the influence of extraversion on device 
securement) is supported, while the remaining H3 set of hypotheses are not supported. 
Hypotheses H4 is not supported. Further mean differences across security behaviors 
are tested using ANOVA’s in the next sections. Overall, the predictors in the 
regression model account for 5.2% of variance in users’ security behaviors of device 
securement. 
 
Table 3: Regression results for online security behavior of device securement 
 Regression Coefficients 
Predictor Variable B SE B β 
Risk-Taking Preferences    
Ethical Risk Taking 0.043 0.073 0.051 
Financial Risk Taking -0.049 0.062 -0.058 
Health/Safety Risk Taking 0.001 0.062 0.002 
Social Risk Taking 0.009 0.059 0.009 
Decision-Making Style    
Rational Decision Making 0.267 0.099 0.164** 
Intuitive Decision Making -0.024 0.088 -0.017 
Dependant Decision Making -0.014 0.081 -0.01 
Avoidant Decision Making -0.065 0.066 -0.068 
Spontaneous Decision Making 0.036 0.085 0.031 
Personality Traits    
Agreeableness 0.095 0.107 0.056 
Conscientiousness 0.027 0.102 0.019 
Neuroticism -0.044 0.081 -0.036 
Openness -0.069 0.091 -0.045 
Extraversion 0.186 0.08 0.142* 
Risk Avoidance 0.011 0.081 0.01 
Demographic Factors    
Age -0.009 0.005 -0.154 
Gender 0.027 0.106 0.014 
Role -0.1 0.155 -0.05 
Citizenship -0.27 0.159 -0.091 
Adjusted R2  0.052  
35 
 
*p<0.05.  **p<0.01.  ***p<0.001. 
 
 
5.3.2. Password Generation 
OLS regressions were run on password generation as the outcome variable and risk-
taking preferences, decision-making styles, personality traits and demographic factors 
as the predictor variables. Table 4 lists the standardized and unstandardized betas 
along with standard errors for the regression model.   
 
Table 4: Regression results for online security behavior of password generation 
 Regression Coefficients 
Predictor Variable B SE B β 
Risk-Taking Preferences    
Ethical Risk Taking -0.02 0.06 -0.027 
Financial Risk Taking 0.104 0.05 0.141** 
Health/Safety Risk Taking -0.137 0.051 -0.211* 
Social Risk Taking 0.089 0.049 0.107 
Decision-Making Style    
Rational Decision Making 0.016 0.081 0.011 
Intuitive Decision Making -0.061 0.072 -0.048 
Dependant Decision Making -0.093 0.066 -0.077 
Avoidant Decision Making -0.125 0.054 -0.149* 
Spontaneous Decision Making -0.003 0.07 -0.003 
Personality Traits    
Agreeableness -0.043 0.087 -0.029 
Conscientiousness 0.2 0.084 0.166* 
Neuroticism -0.041 0.066 -0.038 
Openness -0.011 0.074 -0.008 
Extraversion 0.122 0.066 0.106 
Risk Avoidance -0.045 0.067 -0.048 
Demographic Factors    
Age 0.002 0.004 0.033 
Gender 0.261 0.087 0.157** 
Role -0.063 0.127 -0.037 
Citizenship 0.074 0.13 0.029 
Adjusted R2  0.168  




In risk-taking preferences, financial risk-taking (β=0.141, p<0.01)  and health/safety 
risk-taking (β=-0.211, p<0.05)  were found to be unique significant predictors. In 
decision-making styles, avoidant decision-making style (β=-0.149, p<0.05)  was a 
significant unique predictor. In personality traits, conscientiousness (β=0.166, 
p<0.05) was found to be a significant unique predictor.  In demographic factors, 
gender (β=0.157, p<0.01)  was found to have a unique significant effect on users’ 
online security behavior of password generation. Therefore, Hypothesis H1 
(hypothesizing influence of risk-taking preferences on password generation) is 
supported for H1c. In addition, H1b was surprisingly found to be supported in the 
reverse direction. Hypothesis H2 (hypothesizing the influence of decision-making 
style on password generation) is supported for only H2d while the remaining H2 
hypotheses are not supported. Hypothesis H3 (hypothesizing the influence of 
personality traits on password generation) is supported is supported only for H3b, 
while the remaining H3 set of hypotheses are not supported. Hypotheses H4b is 
supported for unique effect while others are not. Further mean differences across 
security behaviors are tested using ANOVA’s in the next sections. Overall, the 
predictors in the regression model account for 16.8% of variance in users’ security 
behaviors of device securement. 
 
5.3.3. Proactive Awareness 
OLS regressions were run on proactive awareness as the outcomes variable and risk-
taking preferences, decision-making styles, personality traits and demographic factors 
as the predictor variables. Table 5 lists the standardized and unstandardized betas 




Table 5: Regression results for online security behavior of proactive awareness 
 Regression Coefficients 
Predictor Variable B SE B β 
Risk-Taking Preferences    
Ethical Risk Taking -0.107 0.054 -0.152* 
Financial Risk Taking 0.007 0.046 0.009 
Health/Safety Risk Taking -0.084 0.046 -0.137 
Social Risk Taking 0.022 0.044 0.027 
Decision-Making Style    
Rational Decision Making 0.182 0.074 0.135* 
Intuitive Decision Making -0.037 0.066 -0.031 
Dependant Decision Making -0.123 0.06 -0.108* 
Avoidant Decision Making -0.124 0.049 -0.157* 
Spontaneous Decision Making -0.056 0.063 -0.057 
Personality Traits    
Agreeableness -0.035 0.079 -0.025 
Conscientiousness -0.05 0.076 -0.044 
Neuroticism 0.03 0.06 0.03 
Openness 0.112 0.067 0.09 
Extraversion 0.092 0.06 0.085 
Risk Avoidance -0.038 0.061 -0.043 
Demographic Factors    
Age 0.002 0.004 0.047 
Gender 0.212 0.079 0.135** 
Role 0.156 0.115 0.096 
Citizenship 0.106 0.118 0.044 
Adjusted R2  0.228  
*p<0.05.  **p<0.01.  ***p<0.001. 
 
In risk-taking preferences, ethical risk-taking (β=-0.152, p<0.05)  was found to be a 
unique significant predictor. In decision-making styles, rational decision-making style 
(β=-0.135, p<0.05), dependent decision-making style (β=-0.108, p<0.05), and 
avoidant decision-making style (β=-0.157, p<0.05)  were found to have significant 
unique effects on proactive awareness. There was no significant unique effect of any 
personality traits on users’ security behavior of proactive awareness. In demographic 
factors, gender (β=0.135, p<0.01)  was found to have a unique significant effect on 
users’ online security behavior of proactive awareness. Therefore, Hypothesis H1 
(hypothesizing influence of risk-taking preferences on proactive awareness) is 
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supported for H1a, while others are not supported. Hypothesis H2 (hypothesizing the 
influence of decision-making style on password generation) is supported for only 
H2a, H2c and H2d while the remaining H2 hypotheses are not supported. Hypothesis 
H3 (hypothesizing the influence of personality traits on password generation) is not 
supported. Hypotheses H4b is supported for unique effect while others are not. 
Further mean differences across security behaviors are tested using ANOVA’s in the 
next sections. Overall, the predictors in the regression model account for 22.8% of 
variance in users’ security behaviors of device securement. 
 
5.3.4. Updating 
OLS regressions were run on updating as the outcome variable and risk-taking 
preferences, decision-making styles, personality traits and demographic factors as the 
predictor variables. Table 6 lists the standardized and unstandardized betas along with 
standard errors for the regression model.   
  
Table 6: Regression results for online security behavior of updating 
 Regression Coefficients 
Predictor Variable B SE B β 
Risk-Taking Preferences    
Ethical Risk Taking 0.127 0.071 0.145 
Financial Risk Taking 0.056 0.061 0.065 
Health/Safety Risk Taking -0.131 0.061 -0.172* 
Social Risk Taking 0.071 0.058 0.072 
Decision-Making Style    
Rational Decision Making 0.256 0.098 0.153** 
Intuitive Decision Making -0.14 0.087 -0.093 
Dependant Decision Making 0.148 0.08 0.104 
Avoidant Decision Making -0.057 0.065 -0.058 
Spontaneous Decision Making 0.294 0.084 0.243*** 
Personality Traits    
Agreeableness -0.005 0.105 -0.003 
Conscientiousness 0.256 0.101 0.181* 
Neuroticism -0.035 0.079 -0.028 
Openness -0.16 0.089 -0.103 
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Extraversion 0.014 0.079 0.01 
Risk Avoidance 0.103 0.08 0.092 
Demographic Factors    
Age 0.009 0.005 0.144 
Gender 0.264 0.104 0.135* 
Role -0.077 0.152 -0.038 
Citizenship 0.063 0.157 0.021 
Adjusted R2  0.126  
*p<0.05.  **p<0.01.  ***p<0.001. 
 
In risk-taking preferences, health/safety risk-taking (β=-0.172, p<0.05 was found to 
be a unique significant predictor. In decision-making styles, rational decision-making 
style (β=0.153, p<0.01) and spontaneous decision-making style (β=0.243, p<0.001)   
were found to have unique significant effects. In personality traits, conscientiousness 
(β=0.181, p<0.05) was found to be a significant unique predictor.  In demographic 
factors, gender (β=0.135, p<0.05)  was found to have a unique significant effect on 
users’ online security behavior of password generation. Therefore, Hypothesis H1 
(hypothesizing influence of risk-taking preferences on password generation) is 
supported for H1c. Hypothesis H2 (hypothesizing the influence of decision-making 
style on password generation) is supported for only H2a. In addition, H2e is supported 
in reverse direction, while the remaining hypotheses are not supported. Hypothesis H3 
(hypothesizing the influence of personality traits on password generation) is 
supported only for H3b, while the remaining H3 set of hypotheses are not supported. 
Hypotheses H4b is supported for unique effect while others are not. Further mean 
differences across security behaviors are tested using ANOVA’s in the next sections. 
Overall, the predictors in the regression model account for 12.6% of variance in users’ 




The overall significant effects of the predictors on the outcomes variables is 
summarized in Table 7: 
 








Ethical Risk Taking   -0.152*  
Financial Risk Taking  0.141*   
Health/Safety Risk Taking  -0.21**  -0.172* 
Social Risk Taking     
Rational Decision Making 0.164**  0.135* 0.153** 
Intuitive Decision Making     
Dependant Decision Making   -0.108*  
Avoidant Decision Making  -0.149* -0.157*  
Spontaneous Decision Making    0.243*** 
Risk Avoidance     
Extraversion 0.142*    
Agreeableness     
Conscientiousness  0.166*  0.181* 
Neuroticism     
Openness     
Age     
Gender  0.157** 0.135* 0.135* 
Role     
Citizenship     
*p<0.05.  **p<0.01.  ***p<0.001. 
 
It is important to note that the predictors were not consistently related to the four 
studied constructs of security behavior. For example, spontaneous decision-making 
was a strong predictor of the security behavior, updating, but was not associated with 
the other three outcome variables. The uniformity and diversity of the patterns of 
predictors on four outcomes variables and the possible underlying reasons for such 




ANOVA’s along with post-hoc tests of Tukey HSD and Games-Howell were 
conducted to test research question 2, i.e. the mean differences of online security 
behaviors across demographics of age, gender, role, major, citizenship and 
employment length. 
 
5.4. User Online Security Behavior by demographics 
H4 was tested with a series of ANOVAs. Results show that user security behaviors 
differ significantly across the demographic factors age, gender, role and majors. There 
were no significant differences observed across the demographic factors of citizenship 
and employment length in the university. Another important finding is that the 
demographic factors, which were found to have significant differences, did not differ 




ANOVA findings for H4a show significant differences in security behaviors of 
password generation, proactive awareness and updating among the various age 
groups, but no significant differences in device securement were found. Table 8 
shows the results of ANOVA organized by outcome variables. 
 
Table 8: Mean differences in security behavior by Age 
 Source df SS MS F 
Device 
Securement 
Between Groups 5 9.56 1.912 2.231 
Within Groups 337 288.818 0.857  
Total 342 298.379   
Password 
Generation 
Between Groups 5 11.457 2.291 3.419** 
Within Groups 338 226.508 0.67  





Between Groups 5 25.798 5.16 9.531*** 
Within Groups 337 182.444 0.541  
Total 342 208.243   
Updating Between Groups 5 16.02 3.204 3.554** 
Within Groups 337 303.783 0.901  
Total 342 319.802   
*p<0.05.  **p<0.01.  ***p<0.001. 
 
For the outcome variable of password generation, which had significant differences 
among age groups (F (5,338) = 3.419, p<0.01), the age group of 18-25 had lower 
security behaviors compared to the age group of 46-55 (p<0.05). However, there were 
no significant differences found among other age groups.  
  
For the outcome variable of proactive awareness, which had significant 
differences among age groups (F (5,337) = 9.531, p<0.001), the age group of 18-25 
had significantly weaker proactive awareness compared to the age groups of 36-45 
(p<0.05), 46-55 (p<0.05) and 56-65(p<0.01).  
  
For the outcome variable of updating, which had significant differences 
among age groups (F (5,337) = 3.554, p<0.01), the age group of 18-25 had 
significantly weaker security behaviors compared to the age groups of 26-35 
(p<0.05). 
  
H4a, which states younger people have lower security behaviors, is thus 
supported, as age groups of 18-25 in comparison to older age groups had significantly 
lower security behaviors of password generation, proactive awareness and updating, 





ANOVA findings for H4b show significant differences in security behaviors of 
password generation, proactive awareness and updating, but no significant differences 
in device securement by gender. Table 9 shows the results of ANOVA organized by 
outcome variables. 
 
Table 9: Mean differences in security behavior by Gender 
 Source df SS MS F 
Device 
Securement 
Between Groups 1 0.147 0.147 0.168 
Within Groups 341 298.232 0.875  
Total 342 298.379  
Password 
Generation 
Between Groups 1 9.565 9.565 14.322*** 
Within Groups 342 228.401 0.668  





Between Groups 1 3.92 3.92 6.542* 
Within Groups 341 204.323 0.599  
Total 342 208.243  
Updating Between Groups 1 7.884 7.884 8.619** 
Within Groups 341 311.919 0.915  
Total 342 319.802  
*p<0.05.  **p<0.01.  ***p<0.001. 
 
Females in comparison to males had lower security behaviors of password generation 
(F(1,342) = 14.322, p<0.001), proactive awareness (F(1,341) = 6.542, p<0.05), and 
updating (F(1,341) = 8.619, p<0.01). Thus, H4b is supported for security behaviors of 




ANOVA findings for H4c show significant differences in security behaviors of all 
four outcome variables of device securement, password generation, proactive 
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awareness and updating for students vs faculty/staff. Table 10 shows the results of 
ANOVA organized by outcome variables. 
 
Table 10: Mean differences in security behavior by Role 
 Source df SS MS F 
Device 
Securement 
Between Groups 1 4.3 4.3 4.987* 
Within Groups 341 294.078 0.862  
Total 342 298.379  
Password 
Generation 
Between Groups 1 4.458 4.458 6.529* 
Within Groups 342 233.508 0.683  





Between Groups 1 19.583 19.583 35.396*** 
Within Groups 341 188.66 0.553  
Total 342 208.243  
Updating Between Groups 1 4.565 4.565 4.938* 
Within Groups 341 315.237 0.924  
Total 342 319.802 
 
 
*p<0.05.  **p<0.01.  ***p<0.001. 
 
One-way ANOVA for testing the mean differences in security behavior by role 
showed significant differences for all of the four outcome variables of device 
securement (F(1,341) = 4.987, p<0.05), password generation (F(1,341) = 6.529, 
p<0.05), proactive awareness (F(1,341) = 35.396, p<0.001) and Updating (F(1,341) = 
4.938, p<0.05).  However, the division of role into student and faculty/staff would 
also have age as a factor, as age of faculty/staff would be much higher than students. 
To account for this, ANCOVA was run on outcome variables by role controlling for 
age. Table 11 shows the ANCOVA results organized by the outcome variables. 
 
Table 11: ANCOVA on security behavior by Role controlled by Age 
 Source SS df MS F 
Device Securement Age 4.269 1 4.269 5.009* 
 Role 0.148 1 0.148 0.173 
 Error 289.809 340 0.852  
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Password Generation Age 1.013 1 1.013 1.505 
 Role 0.190 1 0.190 0.282 
 Error 228.974 340 0.673  
Proactive Awareness Age 1.829 1 1.829 3.329 
 Role 2.591 1 2.591 4.716* 
 Error 186.83 340 0.550  
Updating Age 2.278 1 2.278 2.475 
 Role 0.009 1 0.009 0.010 
 Error 312.959 340 0.92  
 
After controlling for age, there were significant differences by role only for proactive 
awareness (F(1,1,340) = 4.716, p<0.01). Faculty/staff were noted to have high 
security behaviors of proactive awareness (p<0.05). H4c, which states students would 
have higher security behavior than faculty/staff, was thus supported partly, as the 
faculty/staff group was observed to have better proactive awareness. 
 
5.4.4. Majors 
ANOVA findings for H4d show significant differences in security behaviors for 
device securement and password generation. Table 12 shows the results of ANOVA 
organized by outcome variables. 
 
Table 12: Mean differences in security behavior by Major 
  df SS MS F 
Device 
Securement 
Between Groups 3 9.501 2.375 2.802* 
Within Groups 212 178.872 0.848  
Total 215 188.372  
Password 
Generation 
Between Groups 3 8.418 2.104 3.378* 
Within Groups 212 131.441 0.623  
Total 215 139.859  
Proactive 
Awareness 
Between Groups 3 2.507 0.627 1.092 
Within Groups 213 121.057 0.574  
Total 215 123.564 
 
 
Updating Between Groups 3 7.31 1.827 1.903 
Within Groups 213 202.657 0.96  
Total 215 209.967 
 
 




For the outcome variable of device securement, which had significant differences 
among majors (F(3,212) = 2.802, p<0.01), engineering majors had higher security 
behavior compared to humanities (p<0.05). However, there were no significant 
differences found among other majors of behavioral sciences and business.   
 
 For the outcome variable of password generation, which had significant 
differences among majors (F (3,212) = 3.378, p<0.01), engineering majors had higher 
security behaviors compared to humanities (p<0.05). However, there were no 
significant differences found among the other majors of behavioral sciences and 
business. H4d, that engineering and technical majors have better security behavior as 
compared to non-technical majors, is supported for behaviors of device securement 
and password generation. 
 
5.4.5. Citizenship 
ANOVA findings for H4e were non-significant for all outcome variables. Table 13 
shows the results of ANOVA organized by outcome variables. 
 
Table 13: Mean differences in security behavior by Citizenship 
  df SS MS F 
Device 
Securement 
Between Groups 1 4.096 0.683 0.779 
Within Groups 341 294.283 0.876  
Total 342 298.379  
Password 
Generation 
Between Groups 1 1.261 0.21 0.299 
Within Groups 341 236.704 0.702  





Between Groups 1 6.679 1.113 1.856 
Within Groups 341 201.563 0.6  
Total 342 208.243  
Updating Between Groups 1 3.32 0.553 0.587 
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Within Groups 341 316.483 0.942  
Total 342 319.802  
 
The distribution of sample between U.S. Citizens and Non-U.S. Citizens category is 
in ratio of 9:1, and hence would have resulted in not identifying the differences 
between the two groups. Thus, H4e is not supported. 
 
5.4.6. Employment Length in the university 
ANOVA findings for H4f were non-significant differences for all four outcome 
variables. Table 14 shows the results of ANOVA organized by outcome variables. 
 
Table 14: Mean differences in security behavior by Employment Length 
  df SS MS F 
Device 
Securement 
Between Groups 3 6.828 1.366 1.509 
Within Groups 119 105.914 0.905  
Total 122 112.742  
Password 
Generation 
Between Groups 3 4.357 0.871 1.113 
Within Groups 119 91.59 0.783  
Total 122 95.947  
Proactive 
Awareness 
Between Groups 3 3.613 0.723 1.523 
Within Groups 119 55.506 0.474  
Total 122 59.119 
 
 
Updating Between Groups 3 5.71 1.142 1.588 
Within Groups 119 84.113 0.719  
Total 122 89.823  
 
Hypothesis H4f that security behaviors increase with the employment length in the 
university is not supported. 
 
Further, non-response analysis was performed to test for the presence of a non-




5.5. Non-Response Analysis  
Demographics of age, gender, role, major and citizenship were considered as factors 
for non-response analysis. Non-response bias of age was tested using t-test to 
compare the average ages of response and non-response groups. Chi-square tests were 
performed to check for non-response bias in gender, role, major and citizenship. 
Following is the summary of the statistical test results: 
 
• Average age of respondents (M = 31.47, SD = 15.3) in comparison to average 
of of non-respondents (M = 28.53, SD = 13.57) was significantly higher 
(t(4266) = 3.941,  p<0.01). Therefore, respondents were slightly older than 
non-respondents. 
• There was a significant non-response bias introduced by gender ( X2 (1, N= 
4353) = 33.87, p<0.01). Respondents were more likely to be females. 
• There was a significant non-response bias introduced by role ( X2(1, N= 4353) 
= 15.767, p<0.01). Faculty/Staff were more likely to respond than students. 
• There was no significant non-response bias introduced with the demographic 
factor of major in the students sub-sample (X2(1, N= 1683) = 3.846, p=0.279). 
• There was a significant non-response bias introduced by citizenship ( X2 (1, 
N= 4353) = 4.861, p<0.05). Respondents were more likely to be U.S. Citizens. 
• There was no significant difference t(315) = 0.226,  p = 0.763) in the average 
employment length of respondents (M = 11.52, SD = 10.551) in comparison to 




Overall, there was found to be a significant non-response bias in the demographic 
factors of age, gender, role and citizenship. Hence, the findings from the survey are 
subject to a possible non-response bias. 
 
 
5.6. Interview Analysis 
Descriptive open content coding was used to analyze the transcribed interviews and 
the observation forms. Focusing on the individual’s phishing victimization and 
security practices, the following five problem areas were identified: 
 
• Gap in self risk-taking vs. researcher rating (lack of risk awareness): 
There is a significant gap between the interviewee’s assessment of the amount 
of risk they take and the interviewer’s assessment. Self risk-taking is the self-
rating given by the interviewees when asked to rate themselves on the risk 
they take online on a scale on  1 to 7. Researcher rating is the risk-taking 
rating given to each of the interviewees by the researchers based on their 
responses to computer and internet security practices and awareness of risks. 
There was a clear indication of a lack of risk awareness that was seen in the 
interviews, which accounted for the difference in these ratings. 
 
• Heavy reliance on local IT staff and lack of sense of responsibility: In four 
of the seven interviews, there was a clear identification that the university 
members, in specific faculty/staff, who rely on the IT staff completely to 
account for their online security practices. Questions on their updating 
practices revealed that there is a lack of a sense of responsibility from the 
participant’s end to secure themselves online. Instead, they see it as the job of 





• Minimal understanding of expected cybersecurity behavior: Consistent 
with Leach (2003), one of the key factors that influenced user security 
behaviors is the users’ understanding of what behaviors are expected from 
them as  part of the university, i.e. having knowledge of the values, policies, 
standards and procedures in the organization. In most of the interviews, the 
users indicated that they did not understand these. 
 
• Cybersecurity not a priority: For five of the seven interviewees, 
cybersecurity was not a priority. The other jobs were given higher priority, 
and cybersecurity was viewed as a task for which no time could be spared. 
 
 
• Lack of a standard IT system for security reporting and ineffective 
outreach: Many interviewees considered the IT division highly decentralized 
and lacking standard procedures for security reporting. They also did not 
know how to report security compromises 
 
Table 15 lists supporting quotes that relate to the above-defined problem areas or gaps 
identified. 
 
Table 15: Identified problem areas affecting security of the organization 
Security Problem Supporting Quotes and explanations 
Gap in self risk-taking 
vs. researcher rating 
(Lack of risk awareness) 
 
High risk-taking self rating(On a scale from 1-7): 4- 
“Maybe a 3.-4 I mean, I'm aware that just by going 
online you're exposing yourself to a certain amount of 
risk , and the balance is a risk; being shut off from 
everything." p. 6: "I am very careful about how I use my 
university assigned email address." "…My email is 




Interviewee doesn't download unnecessary things; 
doesn't click on links hastily, uses PayPal to make 
transactions; uses ProtectMyID service and checks 
reports, purchases security patches if required  




Low risk-taking selfrating: 1 -  “Social media, I don't 
do any". "The people in the chemistry IT mgt very well 
have suggested changing the password, uh, but I could 
just go back and forth between our grand-children's 
names and numbers." (Interviewee#3) 
Researcher rating:  moderate-high risk-taking 
Heavy reliance on local 
IT staff and lack of sense 
of responsibility 
"If Sean tells  me to do something, I do it." "If IT tells 
me to do something, I do it. Otherwise, it's possible, but 
I don't think I could care less." "I really don't. I mean, 
you guys..I mean, IT has a job to do, they do their job." 
(Interviewee#1) 
There were a few things that came from the IT group 
here, and I called Caedmon, and I said 'Hey, I've got this 
thing, and is it okay?" p. 9 "What I would do again is get 
in touch with Caedmon and if I noticed say greater 
incidents of things that appeared to be non-legitimate. 
But I don't install things myself. I'll call him and say, 'Do 
we need to install something? but I would have them do 
it." (Interviewee#3) 
 





"Is this something I need to pay attention to?”  
“Do we need to install something? If so, I would have 
them do it." (Interviewee#7) 
 
Cybersecurity not a 
priority 
"I don't have time for this. Like, and you can tell people 
like, I do not have time for one more change...." 
Recalled mid-year switch to new course management 
system. "I do not want any more changes of stuff like 
this right now. Like, I don't have time for this. I do not 
have time." "...I'm an educated person. I obviously, like 
all these people are, and we know what we should be 
doing, and I know my colleagues, some of them are 
probably much better at it than I am, but I'm just like...'I 
don't know. That's like one more thing I need to do and 
figure out.' And I just don't have time." (Interviewee#7) 





The above quotes from the interviewees indicated that 
their other jobs take priority and they don’t have time to 
spare for cybersecurity. 
Lack of standard IT 
system for security 
reporting and ineffective 
outreach 
"I would have no idea how to report an issue. Just 
because of the email that was sent out that said, if you 
get this email let us know at this number, but, if that 
email hadn't gone out I dont think I would know who to 
contact because, to be honest, the system at this 
university is extremely confusing to me. School has its 
own IT, university has its IT. And sometimes, I contact 
the university IT about something and they're like, "No, 
you need to go to your school. So, I get really confused" 
(Interviewee#6)  
 
“sometimes the university, from what I recall, sent out 
an email to give us a heads up when something's, um, 
going around. I didn’t think it was important So, maybe 
if that email had like, and maybe it was marked high 
importance, that would be helpful if it was. So those are 





Recommendations and possible solutions based on the above identified problem areas 




This section presents a deeper interpretation of the results by providing implications 
for theory and for practice (security messaging). Toward the end of this section, 
general strategies or solutions for the problem areas identified through interview 
analysis are discussed.  
 
6.1. Device Securement 
In line with previous literature, risk-taking preferences were not found to have any 
relationship with the online security behavior of device securement. This reinforces 
that risk-taking is not an important factor that influences the user security behavior of 
securing devices. Previous research has found that people who engage in better 
security behaviors of device securement are less likely to have avoidant decision-
making style (Egelman et al., 2015). However, this study did not find any relation 
between avoidant decision-making style and online security behavior of device 
securement in the regression model, indicating that avoidant decision-making style is 
not a unique predictor over the other predictor variables. Moreover, the rational 
decision-making style was a significant predictor. This suggests that people who 
engage in better security practices with device securement are likely to evaluate the 
decision of locking their device or using a PIN. Since only 5% of the variance in the 
outcome variable was explained by the predictor variables, there are other factors that 
need to be evaluated to identify the individual differences that influence this behavior. 
This study also extends previous research by looking at personality traits and 
demographic factors that influence the online security behavior of device securement. 
People who are more extraverted tend to have better security practices of updating. 
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When tested for the differences by demographic factors, engineering majors were 
found to have higher online security behavior of device securement in comparison to 
humanities. Table 16 consolidates the results of hypothesis testing on the security 
behavior outcome, device securement. 
 






Risk-Taking Preferences   
Ethical (H1a) t(346) = 0.594, ns Not supported 
Financial (H1b) t(346) = -0.799, ns Not supported 
Health/Safety (H1c) t(346) = 0.019, ns Not supported 
Social (H1e) t(346) = 0.143, ns Not supported 
Decision-Making Styles   
Rational (H2a) t(346) = 2.691, p<0.01 Supported 
Intuitive (H2b) t(346) = -0.278, ns Not supported 
Dependant (H2c) t(346) = -0.174, ns Not supported 
Avoidant (H2d) t(346) = -0.976, ns Not supported 
Spontaneous (H2e) t(346) = 0.427, ns Not supported 
Personality Traits   
Agreeableness (H3a) t(346) = 0.889, ns Not supported 
Conscientiousness (H3b) t(346) = 0.262, ns Not supported 
Neuroticism (H3c) t(346) = -0.541, ns Not supported 
Openness (H3d) t(346) = -0.757, ns Not supported 
Extraversion (H3e) t(346) = 2.315, p<0.05 Supported 
Risk Avoidance (H3f) t(346) = 0.131, ns Not supported 
Demographics   
Age (H4a) F(5,337) = 2.231, ns Not supported 
Gender (H4b) F(1,341) = 0.168, ns Not supported 
Role (H4c) F(1,340) = 0.173, ns Not supported 
Major (H4d) F(3,212) = 2.802, p<0.05 Supported 
Citizenship (H4e) F(1,341) = 0.779, ns Not supported 
Employment Length (H4f) F(3,119) = 1.509, ns Not supported 
 
6.2. Password Generation 
Previous research has found correlations between engagement in better practices of 
password generation and rational and avoidant decision making styles. However, in 
this study, only avoidant decision-making style was found to be a significant factor. 
This implies that users’ are less likely to evaluate their decision of choosing strong 
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passwords or reusing passwords in a systematic way. On the other hand, the internal 
consistency for outcome variable of password generation on SeBIS scale was found to 
be moderate. Hence this finding needs to be further evaluated with better 
measurement techniques.   
 
In previous literature, individuals who are willing to take more ethical risks 
were found to engage in weaker security behaviors while users who take higher social 
risks were found to engage in better security behaviors (Egelman et al., 2015). In this 
study, while there were no significant correlations between ethical risk-taking and 
password generation, significant positive correlations were found with financial risk-
taking, while negative correlation was found with health/safety risk-taking. This 
suggests that people who are willing to take higher financial risks tend to have better 
password generation practices, suggesting that they see a need for creating strong 
passwords and not reusing them. Also, people who care about their health/safety tend 
to have better security behaviors of password generation.  
 
The predictors in the regression model explained close to 17% of the variance 
in the outcome variable. These results suggest security messages that aim to promote 
better security practices of password generation could include examples of the 
benefits of stronger passwords and reduced reuse of passwords in explaining the 
benefits they offer to investment or gambling accounts, while pointing to threats that 
could occur to health/safety when weak passwords are used.  
 
In accordance with the earlier findings, although the demographics of age and 
major did not have unique effects in the regression model, ANOVA findings suggest  
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that younger people and women are more likely reuse passwords (Shay et al., 2010), 
women and those age 18-25 reported weaker security around password generation. 
On exploring additional demographics, individuals in engineering majors tend to have 
better password generation practices in comparison to humanities majors. Table 17 
consolidates the results of hypothesis testing on security behavior outcome, password 
generation. 
 






Risk-Taking Preferences   
Ethical (H1a) t(346) = -0.342, ns Not supported 
Financial (H1b) t(346) = 2.053, p<0.05 Supported 
Health/Safety (H1c) t(346) = -2.688, p<0.05 Supported 
Social (H1e) t(346) = 1.833, p<0.05 Supported 
Decision-Making Styles   
Rational (H2a) t(346) = 0.192, ns Not supported 
Intuitive (H2b) t(346) = -0.844, ns Not supported 
Dependant (H2c) t(346) = -1.407, ns Not supported 
Avoidant (H2d) t(346) = -2.293, p<0.01 Supported 
Spontaneous (H2e) t(346) = -0.044, ns Not supported 
Personality Traits   
Agreeableness (H3a) t(346) = -0.486, ns Not supported 
Conscientiousness (H3b) t(346) = 2.382, p<0.05 Supported 
Neuroticism (H3c) t(346) = -0.618, ns Not supported 
Openness (H3d) t(346) = -0.146, ns Not supported 
Extraversion (H3e) t(346) = 1.855, ns Not supported 
Risk Avoidance (H3f) t(346) = -0.679, ns Not supported 
Demographics   
Age (H4a) F(5,337) = 3.419, p<0.01 Supported 
Gender (H4b) F(1,341) = 14.332, p<0.001 Supported 
Role (H4c) F(1,340) = 0.282, ns Not supported 
Major (H4d) F(3,212) = 3.378, p<0.05 Supported 
Citizenship (H4e) F(1,341) = 0.299, ns Not supported 





6.3. Proactive Awareness 
Previous research has found correlations between engagement in better practices of 
proactive awareness to rational, avoidant and dependent decision-making styles. Also, 
individuals who are willing to take more ethical and health/safety risks were 
associated with weaker security behaviors (Egelman et al., 2015). This study’s 
findings concur with the previous findings and do not have any further deviations, 
suggesting that people who are likely to engage in better password generation 
practices are not likely to procrastinate or depend on other factors to insure their 
security. Further, with addition of personality traits, there were no significant 
correlations in the model. Like the password generation measure, proactive awareness 
was found to have moderate internal consistency. Hence these results need to be 
further evaluated. The predictors in the regression model explain 23% of the variance 
in proactive awareness. Therefore, security messaging should draw attention to ethical 
and health/safety risks that could occur with lower compliance. 
  
 Again, though the demographic factors of age and role was not found to have 
a unique influence on proactive awareness, ANOVA findings suggest that women and 
those age 18-25 reported significantly weaker security behaviors of proactive 
awareness, suggesting that these groups pay lesser attention to contextual cues such as 
the URL bar or other browser indicators. This is consistent with the literature on the 
demographics of age and gender and phishing susceptibility (Sheng et al., 2010). 
When tested for role in the university, the faculty/staff were found to have higher 
proactive awareness, even after controlling for age. With regards to educational 
background, earlier research has found business, education and liberal arts students to 
be more vulnerable to spear phishing attacks than technology and science students 
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(Darwish et al., 2012). However, this study did not find any significant differences for 
both the groups of students and faculty/staff on the outcome variable of proactive 
awareness. As mentioned earlier, this finding should be evaluated further owing to the 
moderate internal consistency of the outcome variable obtained on SeBIS scale. Table 
18 consolidates the results of hypothesis testing on security behavior outcome, 
proactive awareness. 
 






Risk-Taking Preferences   
Ethical (H1a) t(346) = -1.977, p<0.05 Supported 
Financial (H1b) t(346) = 0.143, ns Not supported 
Health/Safety (H1c) t(346) = -1.822, p<0.05 Supported 
Social (H1e) t(346) = 0.488, ns Not supported 
Decision-Making Styles   
Rational (H2a) t(346) = 2.464, p<0.05 Supported 
Intuitive (H2b) t(346) = -0.569, ns Not supported 
Dependant (H2c) t(346) = -2.046, p<0.05 Supported 
Avoidant (H2d) t(346) = -2.507, p<0.01 Supported 
Spontaneous (H2e) t(346) = -0.885, ns Not supported 
Personality Traits   
Agreeableness (H3a) t(346) = -0.446, ns Not supported 
Conscientiousness (H3b) t(346) = -0.658, ns Not supported 
Neuroticism (H3c) t(346) = 0.498, ns Not supported 
Openness (H3d) t(346) = 1.661, ns Not supported 
Extraversion (H3e) t(346) = 1.540, ns Not supported 
Risk Avoidance (H3f) t(346) = -0.632, ns Not supported 
Demographics   
Age (H4a) F(5,337) = 9.531, p<0.001 Supported 
Gender (H4b) F(1,341) = 6.542, p<0.05 Supported 
Role (H4c) F(1,340) = 4.716, p<0.05 Supported 
Major (H4d) F(3,212) = 1.092, ns Not supported 
Citizenship (H4e) F(1,341) = 1.856, ns Not supported 
Employment Length 
(H4f) 





Previous research has found positive correlations between engagement in better 
practices of updating to rational, avoidant and spontaneous decision-making styles. 
Moreover, individuals who are willing to take more ethical and health/safety risks 
were associated with lower security behavior (Egelman et al., 2015). This study’s 
findings differed significantly from the earlier findings. While health/safety risk-
taking preferences still remained significant predictors of updating security behaviors, 
there was no relationship between ethical risk-taking preferences and updating. Since 
the earlier studies have only explored correlations and not tested for unique influence 
of the factors on updating, it can be inferred that ethical risk-taking does not uniquely 
predict users’ security behaviors of keeping software up-to-date.  
  
With decision-making styles, while rational, avoidant and decision-making 
styles correlated significantly before the addition of personality traits, the effect of 
avoidant decision-making style was suppressed with conscientiousness and risk-
avoidance personality traits significantly predicted the security behaviors of updating. 
This suggests that people who have better security behaviors of updating tend to be 
risk-averse rather than procrastinating. Since conscientiousness is a significant 
predictor, in addition to the emphasis on risk-taking and decision-making, messages 
emphasizing policy adherence and standards may be more effective. 
 
When tested for the effect of demographics, although age was not found to 
have a unique effect in the regression model, ANOVA findings suggest that women 
and those age 18-25 were less likely to keep software up-to-date. This was in line 
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with the other three outcome variables. Table 19 consolidates the results of hypothesis 
testing on security behavior outcome, proactive awareness. 
 






Risk-Taking Preferences   
Ethical (H1a) t(346) = 1.774, p<0.05 Not Supported 
Financial (H1b) t(346) = 0.925, ns Not supported 
Health/Safety (H1c) t(346) = -2.139, p<0.05 Supported 
Social (H1e) t(346) = 1.215, ns Not supported 
Decision-Making Styles   
Rational (H2a) t(346) = 2.614, p<0.05 Supported 
Intuitive (H2b) t(346) = -1.612, ns Not supported 
Dependant (H2c) t(346) = 1.855, p<0.05 Supported 
Avoidant (H2d) t(346) = -0.876, p<0.01 Supported 
Spontaneous (H2e) t(346) = 3.520, ns Not supported 
Personality Traits   
Agreeableness (H3a) t(346) = -0.047, ns Not supported 
Conscientiousness (H3b) t(346) = 2.543, ns Not supported 
Neuroticism (H3c) t(346) = -0.438, ns Not supported 
Openness (H3d) t(346) = -1.790, ns Not supported 
Extraversion (H3e) t(346) = 0.176, ns Not supported 
Risk Avoidance (H3f) t(346) = 1.281, ns Not supported 
Demographics   
Age (H4a) F(5,337) = 3.554, p<0.01 Supported 
Gender (H4b) F(1,341) = 8.619, p<0.01 Supported 
Role (H4c) F(1,340) = 0.010, ns Supported 
Major (H4d) F(3,212) = 1.903, ns Not supported 
Citizenship (H4e) F(1,341) = 0.587, ns Not supported 
Employment Length (H4f) F(3,119) = 1.588, ns Not supported 
 
As discussed in the above sections, the results varied by the type of security behavior. 
For example, the predictor variable, financial risk-taking was associated with the 
security behavior of password generation, but not with other security behaviors of 
device securement, proactive awareness and updating. An overview of the results 
from the statistical testing of the entire hypothesis from the research model is 
presented in Table 20. 















Ethical  t(346) = 0.594, 
ns 
t(346) = -0.342, 
ns 
t(346) = -1.977, 
p<0.05 
t(346) = 1.505,  
ns 
Financial  t(346) = -0.799, 
ns 
t(346) = 2.053, 
p<0.05 
t(346) = 0.143, 
ns 
t(346) = 1.046,  
ns 
Health/Safety  t(346) = 0.019, 
ns 
t(346) = -2.688, 
p<0.05 
t(346) = -1.822, 
p<0.05 
t(346) = -2.471, 
p<0.05 
Social  t(346) = 0.143, 
ns 
t(346) = 1.833, 
p<0.05 
t(346) = 0.488, 
ns 
t(346) = 1.530,  
ns 
Decision-Making Styles 
Rational  t(346) = 2.691, 
p<0.01 
t(346) = 0.192, 
ns 
t(346) = 2.464, 
p<0.05 
t(346) = 2.478, 
p<0.05 
Intuitive  t(346) = -0.278, 
ns 
t(346) = -0.844, 
ns 
t(346) = -0.569, 
ns 
t(346) = -1.774, 
ns 
Dependant  t(346) = -0.174, 
ns 
t(346) = -1.407, 
ns 
t(346) = -2.046, 
p<0.05 
t(346) = 1.742,  
ns 
Avoidant  t(346) = -0.976, 
ns 
t(346) = -2.293, 
p<0.01 
t(346) = -2.507, 
p<0.01 
t(346) = -1.050, 
ns 
Spontaneous  t(346) = 0.427, 
ns 
t(346) = -0.044, 
ns 
t(346) = -0.885, 
ns 
t(346) = 3.971, 
p<0.001 
Personality Traits 
Agreeableness t(346) = 
0.889, ns 
t(346) = -0.486, 
ns 
t(346) = -0.446, 
ns 






t(346) = 2.382, 
p<0.05 
t(346) = -0.658, 
ns 
t(346) = 2.497, 
p<0.05 
Neuroticism t(346) = -
0.541, ns 
t(346) = -0.618, 
ns 
t(346) = 0.498, 
ns 
t(346) = -1.110, 
ns 
Openness t(346) = -
0.757, ns 
t(346) = -0.146, 
ns 
t(346) = 1.661, 
ns 
t(346) = -1.754, 
ns 
Extraversion t(346) = 
2.315, p<0.05 
t(346) = 1.855, 
ns 
t(346) = 1.540, 
ns 






t(346) = -0.679, 
ns 
t(346) = -0.632, 
ns 




































Citizenship F(1,341) = F(1,341) = F(1,341) = F(1,341) = 
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6.5. Recommendations  
Based on the findings from the survey and interviews, the following 
recommendations for better organizational cybersecurity are provided. 
• Identify and emphasize different strategies to promote different security 
behaviors. Since the predictor variables did not have uniform effects over all 
the outcome variables of security behaviors, security messaging must be 
tailored to the kind of security behavior that is being promoted.  
 
• Increase risk awareness and security training, and security messaging. 
There was a clear identified gap between the users’ perception of their risk-
taking and what is suggested from their responses to Internet security 
practices. This indicates a lack of risk awareness and hence emphasizes the 
need for training. Also, when asked about the training/awareness exposure, no 
participant referred to educational materials from the university. The only 
exposure they had was either from their earlier environments or general 
security advice that is available online. In addition, when asked for 
suggestions into what could have helped, a majority pointed to services that 
would keep reminding them regularly of the risks. Participants also felt a need 
for training to be precise and to the point. An interesting suggestion was 
having security advice delivered through an alert system to keep the users 
aware of any alarming incidents. Campus alert systems are emergency 
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messaging services that distribute time-sensitive alerts via voice, email, and 
text. 
 
• Increase efforts to improve users’ understanding of what behaviors are 
expected from them. In addition to the training that has been earlier 
emphasized, there is a clear lack of understanding of university policies, 
standards and expectations of cybersecurity behavior.  
 
• Review university policies to regulate, automate, or mandate regular 
software updates. Through the interviews, a theme that was found in a 
majority of the cases was high reliance on IT staff in the college and 
department units to update software.  
 
• Emphasize the importance of cybersecurity, the interruption that could 
occur to regular tasks, and the loss of time in recovering from such 
situations. Cybersecurity was observed to have a lower priority in comparison 
to the regular tasks and responsibilities of most interview participants. 
 
• Adopt better promotional and awareness practices to achieve higher 
compliance with organizational security. Participants emphasized their 
difficulty in security reporting. They cited two reasons. The first relates to the 
organization’s structure being both bureaucratic (having a centralized 
organization delivering services on a university-wide bases) and multi-
divisional (in which individual academic or business units operate their own 
departmental information technology structures to provide services to their 
respective constituents). Discovering the appropriate point of contact in such a 
structure was noted as a frustration. The second is the lack of information 
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about and promotion of a centralized reporting service for security matters. 
For example, ‘spam@umd.edu’ exists as a service to report spams and 
spurious emails. However, there is not enough outreach to the university 









In view of employees being the weakest link in organization cybersecurity, the 
present study findings contribute towards the goal of turning this weakest link into a 
strong asset, by determining the most common characteristics of the individuals that 
are likely to engage in better security practices. Identification of characteristics of 
individuals who pose the biggest security risks for organizations can help 
organizations tailor their security messaging and awareness programs to ensure that 
vulnerabilities created by these “riskier” individuals are addressed. The predictor 
variables of risk-taking preferences, decision-making styles and personality traits 
accounted for about 5-23% of the variance that is associated with online security 
behaviors, indicating that the findings can be employed to achieve higher organization 
security compliance. The study results also emphasized  the variations in the security 
messages or nudges that ought to be given to promote different security behaviors. 
However, there is a need to explore further individual differences and other factors to 
achieve better predictability. The interviews with the phishing attack victims exposed 
the gaps and vulnerabilities in the organization as a whole, which when addressed 





There are several limitations to this study. First, the response rate was low (~9% to 
the surveys), and there was evidence of a non-response bias. Since the organization 
that is studied is a university, the sample was unusually young students and hence it 
was difficult to tease out differences in the sample. This resulted in lower power of 
the multivariate tests analyzed separately for the sub-groups of student and 
faculty/staff. Also, the results of this study might not hold true for other organizations 
in different sectors that have a more diversified user base. 
 
Second, since the nature of the data collection was through an online survey, 
the responses to the security behavior indicate the self-reported data about the user 
behaviors, and hence, could be biased and may not reflect users’ actual behavior. The 
research model should be further tested in a lab experiment for validity.  
 
Third, since only seven interviews could be conducted, the findings and 
identified problem areas might not reflect the population at large. More interviews 
need to be conducted until saturation is achieved. 
 
Fourth, there could be possible threats to internal and external validity of the 
results. A threat to internal validity could be extraneous variables like awareness of 
security policies of the organization and training, which were not a part of the 
research model. A threat to external validity could be the low response rate on the 
surveys and interviews. Due to the possibility of a non-response bias, the sample may 




7.3. Future Research 
The findings from the interviews identify the need to conduct further research in the 
identified gap areas. Measures like awareness of security policies of the organization 
and training, which were not a part of this study, should be considered in the future. 
Based on the findings of the study, interventions should be developed, and 
suggestions of security messaging should be developed and tested through further 








8.1. Appendix A – Survey Instrument 
Project Title 
Risk Assessment of Phishing Victims at a University 




This research is being conducted by Dr. Michel Cukier at the 
University of Maryland, College Park. We are inviting you to 
participate in this research project because you have been selected 
as part of a random sample of members of the university. The 
purpose of this research is to provide the university with 





The procedures involve completing a personality survey, a series of 
questions about your behavior online and offline, and demographic 
information. You will complete the survey from your personal 
computer. The survey should take less than 20 minutes to complete. 
After completing the survey, you will be entered in a drawing for 50 
$10 gift cards. All prize winnings are considered taxable income; gift 
card winners are responsible for any taxes assessed on the $10 prize.  
 
Example Questions: 
Rate each item on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being Strongly Disagree, 3 
being Neutral, and 5 being Strongly Agree. 
I have frequent mood swings 
I make quick decisions. 
Potential Risks and 
Discomforts 
There is little direct risk in participating in this survey. There is a 
small risk of embarrassment, as you will be asked questions about 
sensitive topics such as your drinking habits and sexual history. All 
information will be kept confidential and secured. You do not have to 
answer any question that makes you feel uncomfortable. You may 
quit the survey at any time or skip any question with which you are 
uncomfortable, for any reason. Your participation in this research is 
completely voluntary. You may choose not to take part at all. 
Potential Benefits  This survey will help researchers and campus policy makers better 
understand the factors that make faculty, staff, and students 
vulnerable to phishing attacks. We hope that the university will be 
able to use this research to create better strategies and educational 
materials aimed at keeping our community safe from cyber threats. 
Your responses are a valuable component in helping enhance campus 





Any potential loss of confidentiality will be minimized by taking all 
appropriate measures to protect your data. If we write a report or 
article about this research paper, your identity will be protected to the 
maximum extent possible. All results will be reported in aggregate, 
with no personal identifiers attached that could facilitate 
identification. A hard copy of your consent form will be saved in a 
secure location. Your information may be shared with representatives 
of the University of Maryland, College Park or governmental 
authorities if you or someone else is in danger or if we are required to 
do so by law. 
Right to Withdraw 
and Questions 
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary. You may 
choose not to take part at all. If you decide to participate in this 
research, you may stop participating at any time. If you decide not to 
participate in this study or if you stop participating at any time, you 
will not be penalized or lose any benefits to which you otherwise 
qualify. Your academic standing or professional position will not be 
affected by your decision to terminate participation. 
 
If you decide to stop taking part in the study, if you have questions, 
concerns, or complaints, or if you need to report an injury related to 
the research, please contact the investigator: 
Dr. Michel Cukier 
Phone: 3013142804 
Address: 3149 AV Williams, University of Maryland 
Email: mcukier@umd.edu 
Participant Rights  If you have questions about your rights as a research participant or 
wish to report a research-related injury, please contact:  
 
University of Maryland College Park  
Institutional Review Board Office 
1204 Marie Mount Hall 
College Park, Maryland, 20742 
 E-mail: irb@umd.edu   
Telephone: 301-405-0678 
This research has been reviewed according to the University of 
Maryland, College Park IRB procedures for research involving 
human subjects. 
Statement of Consent Your consent indicates that you are at least 18 years of age; you have 
read this consent form or have had it read to you; your questions have 
been answered to your satisfaction and you voluntarily agree to 
participate in this research study. You are advised to print a copy of 
the consent form for your records. 
If you agree to participate, please click “I Consent” below. 




Section 1: Personality Traits (IPIP) 
 
Please indicate to what extent each of the following statements applies to you. 
 
(1) Very Inaccurate, (2) Moderately Inaccurate, (3) Neither Inaccurate nor Accurate, 
(4) Moderately Accurate, (5) Very Accurate. 
 
Extraversion 
1. I feel comfortable around people. 
2. I make friends easily. 
3. I am skilled in handling social situations. 
4. I am the life of the party. 
5. I know how to captivate people. 
6. I have little to say. 
7. I keep in the background. 
8. I would describe my experiences as somewhat dull. 
9. I don’t like to draw attention to myself. 
10. I don’t talk a lot. 
Agreeableness 
11. I have a good word for everyone. 
12. I believe that others have good intentions. 
13. I respect others. 
14. I accept people as they are. 
15. I make people feel at ease. 
16. I have a sharp tongue. 
17. I cut others to pieces. 
18. I suspect hidden motives in others. 
19. I get back at others. 
20. I insult people. 
Conscientiousness 
21. I am always prepared. 
22. I pay attention to details. 
23. I get chores done right away. 
24. I carry out my plans. 
25. I make plans and stick to them. 
26. I waste my time. 
27. I find it difficult to get down to work. 
28. I do just enough work to get by. 
29. I don’t see things through. 
30. I shirk my duties. 
Neuroticism 
31. I often feel blue. 
32. I dislike myself. 
33. I am often down in the dumps. 
34. I have frequent mood swings. 
35. I panic easily. 
36. I rarely get irritated. 
37. I seldom feel blue. 
38. I feel comfortable with myself. 
39. I am not easily bothered by things. 
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40. I am very pleased with myself. 
Openness to experience 
41. I believe in the importance of art. 
42. I have a vivid imagination. 
43. I tend to vote for liberal political candidates. 
44. I carry the conversation to a higher level. 
45. I enjoy hearing new ideas. 
46. I am not interested in abstract ideas. 
47. I do not like art. 
48. I avoid philosophical discussions. 
49. I do not enjoy going to art museums. 
50. I tend to vote for conservative political candidates. 
Risk-Avoidance 
51. I would never go hang-gliding or bungee jumping. 
52. I would never make a high-risk investment. 
53. I avoid dangerous situations. 
54. I seek danger. 
55. I am willing to try anything once. 
56. I do dangerous things. 
57. I enjoy being reckless. 
58. I seek adventure. 
59. I take risks. 
60. I do crazy things. 
 
Section 2: Decision-Making Style (GDMS) 
 
Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements, according to the five-point scale below ranging from Strongly 
Disagree to Strongly Agree. 
 
(1) Strongly Disagree, (2) Disagree, (3) Neutral, (4) Agree, (5) Strongly Agree.  
 
1. When I make decisions, I tend to rely on my intuition.(Intuitive) 
2. I rarely make important decisions without consulting other people. 
(Dependent) 
3. When I make a decision, it is more important for me to feel the decision is 
right than to have a rational reason for it. (Intuitive) 
4. I double check my information sources to be sure I have the right facts before 
making decisions. (Rational) 
5. I use the advice of other people in making my important decisions. 
(Dependent) 
6. I put off making decisions because thinking about them makes me uneasy. 
(Avoidant) 
7. I make decisions in a logical and systematic way. (Rational) 
8. When making decisions I do what feels natural at the moment. (Spontaneous) 
9. I generally make snap decisions. (Spontaneous) 
10. I like to have someone steer me in the right direction when I am faced with 
important decisions. (Dependent) 
11. My decision making requires careful thought. (Rational) 
12. When making a decision, I trust my inner feelings and reactions. (Intuitive) 
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13. When making a decision, I consider various options in terms of a specified 
goal. (Rational) 
14. I avoid making important decisions until the pressure is on. (Avoidant) 
15. I often make impulsive decisions. (Spontaneous) 
16. When making decisions, I rely upon my instincts. (Intuitive) 
17. I generally make decisions that feel right to me. (Intuitive) 
18. I often need the assistance of other people when making important decisions. 
(Dependent) 
19. I postpone decision making whenever possible. (Avoidant) 
20. I often make decisions on the spur of the moment. (Spontaneous) 
21. I often put off making important decisions. (Avoidant) 
22. If I have the support of others, it is easier for me to make important decisions. 
(Dependent) 
23. I generally make important decisions at the last minute. (Avoidant) 
24. I make quick decisions. (Spontaneous) 
25. I explore all of my options before making a decision. (Rational) 
 
Section 3: Online Security Behaviors (SeBIS) 
 
Please indicate your response to the following questions based on how they apply 
to you. 
 
(1) Never, (2) Rarely, (3) Sometimes, (4) Often, (5) Always.  
 
1. When I’m prompted about a software update, I install it right away. 
(Updating) 
2. I try to make sure that the programs I use are up-to-date. (Updating) 
3. I manually lock my computer screen when I step away from it. (Device 
Securement) 
4. I set my computer screen to automatically lock if I don’t use it for a prolonged 
period of time. (Device Securement) 
5. I use a PIN or passcode to unlock my mobile phone. (Device Securement) 
6. I use a password/passcode to unlock my laptop or tablet. (Device Securement) 
7. If I discover a security problem, I continue what I was doing because I assume 
someone else will fix it. (Proactive Awareness) 
8. When someone sends me a link, I open it without first verifying where it goes. 
(Proactive Awareness) 
9. I verify that my anti-virus software has been regularly updating itself. 
(Updating) 
10. When browsing websites, I mouseover links to see where they go, before 
clicking them. (Proactive Awareness) 
11. I know what website I’m visiting based on its look and feel, rather than by 
looking at the URL bar. (Proactive Awareness) 
12. I do not change my passwords, unless I have to. (Password Generation) 
13. I use different passwords for different accounts that I have. (Password 
Generation) 
14. I do not include special characters in my password if it’s not required. 
(Password Generation) 
15. When I create a new online account, I try to use a password that goes beyond 
the site’s minimum requirements. (Password Generation) 
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16. I submit information to websites without first verifying that it will be sent 
securely (e.g., SSL, “https://”, a lock icon). (Proactive Awareness) 
  
Section 4: Risk-Taking Preferences (DOSPERT) 
 
For each of the following statements, please indicate the likelihood that you 
would engage in the described activity or behavior if you were to find yourself in 
that situation. 
 
 (1) Extremely Unlikely, (2) Moderately Unlikely, (3) Somewhat Unlikely, (4) Not 
Sure, (5) Somewhat Likely, (6) Moderately Likely, (7) Extremely Likely. 
 
1. Admitting that your tastes are different from those of a friend. (Social) 
2. Going camping in the wilderness. (Recreational) 
3. Betting a day’s income at the horse races. (Financial) 
4. Investing 10% of your annual income in a moderate growth mutual fund. 
(Financial) 
5. Drinking heavily at a social function. (Health/Safety) 
6. Taking some questionable deductions on your income tax return. (Ethical) 
7. Disagreeing with an authority figure on a major issue. (Social) 
8. Betting a day’s income at a high-stake poker game. 
9. Having an affair with a married person. (Ethical) 
10. Passing off somebody else’s work as your own. (Ethical) 
11. Going down a ski run that is beyond your ability. (Recreational) 
12. Investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock. (Financial) 
13. Going whitewater rafting at high water in the spring. (Recreational) 
14. Betting a day’s income on the outcome of a sporting event. (Financial) 
15. Engaging in unprotected sex. (Health/Safety) 
16. Revealing a friend’s secret to someone else. (Ethical) 
17. Driving a car without wearing a seat belt. (Health/Safety) 
18. Investing 10% of your annual income in a new business venture. (Financial) 
19. Taking a skydiving class. (Recreational) 
20. Riding a motorcycle without a helmet. (Health/Safety) 
21. Choosing a career that you truly enjoy over a more prestigious one. (Social) 
22. Speaking your mind about an unpopular issue in a meeting at work. (Social) 
23. Sunbathing without sunscreen. (Health/Safety) 
24. Bungee jumping off a tall bridge. (Recreational) 
25. Piloting a small plane. (Recreational) 
26. Walking home alone at night in an unsafe area of town. (Health/Safety) 
27. Moving to a city far away from your extended family. (Social) 
28. Starting a new career in your mid-thirties. (Social) 
29. Leaving your young children alone at home while running an errand. (Ethical) 
30. Not returning a wallet you found that contains $200. (Ethical) 
 
 
Section 5: Demographic questions 
 
We would like you to tell us about your background so that we can review our 





1. What is your gender? 
• ( ) Male 
• ( ) Female 
• ( ) Trans male/trans man 
• ( ) Trans female/trans woman 
• ( ) Gender queer/gender non-conforming 
• ( ) Different identity  
• ( ) Decline to respond 
 
2. What is your age? (respondents should be 18 or over) (pick one) 
• ( ) 18 – 24  
• ( ) 25 – 34  
• ( ) 35 – 44  
• ( ) 45 – 54  
• ( ) 55 – 64  
• ( ) 65+ 
 
3. What is your ethnicity? (check all that apply) 
Are you of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin? 
( ) No, not of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin 
( ) Yes, Mexican, Mexican American, Chicano 
( ) Yes, Puerto Rican 
( ) Yes, Cuban 
( ) Yes, another Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin 
( ) Unavailable/Unknown 





4. What is your race? (check all that apply) 
• ( ) American Indian/Alaska Native 
• ( ) Asian 
• ( ) Black or African American 
• ( ) Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander 
• ( ) White 
• ( ) Some other race  
• ( ) Decline to respond 
• ( ) Unavailable/Unknown 
  
5. What is your highest level of education? (pick one) 
• ( ) Some high school 
• ( ) High school graduate 
• ( ) Some college/Currently in college (undergraduate) 
• ( ) College graduate 
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• ( ) Some graduate/Currently in graduate or professional program 
• ( ) Graduate degree or professional program completed 
• ( ) Other _________________________________ 
 
6. Are you: (pick one) 
• ( ) Not currently a student (skip 6a) 
• ( ) A student in an undergraduate program 
• ( ) A student in a graduate program 
• ( ) A student in some other type of program? Specify: 
___________________________ 
 
• 6.a. What is your undergraduate major or name of your graduate program? 
__________________________________________ 
 
7. Employment status: are you currently? (check all that apply) 
• ( ) Employed for wages 
• ( ) Self-employed 
• ( ) Out of work and looking for work 
• ( ) Out of work but not currently looking for work 
• ( ) A homemaker 
• ( ) A student 
• ( ) Military 
• ( ) Retired 
• ( ) Unable to work 
 
8. What is your marital status? (pick one) 
( ) Single, never married 
( ) Married or domestic partnership 
( ) Widowed 
( ) Divorced 
( ) Separated 
 
9. Are you a citizen of the United States? (pick one) 
• ( ) Yes, born in the United States (skip 9a) 
• ( ) Yes, born in Puerto Rico, Guam, the U. S. Virgin Islands, or Northern 
Marianas. 
• ( ) Yes, born abroad of US  citizen parent or parents 
• ( ) Yes, US  citizen by naturalization. Print year of naturalization: __ __ __ __ 
• ( ) No   
 
• 9.a. When did you come to live in the United States? (If you came to live in 
the US more than once, print latest year) __ __ __ __ 
 
10. Do you speak a language other than English at home? 
• ( ) Yes (please answer 10a and 10b) 




• 10.a. What language(s) do you speak at home? 
__________________________ 
 
• 10.b. How well do you understand/read written English? (pick one) 
• ( ) Beginner  
• ( ) Intermediate 
• ( ) Advanced 
• ( ) Native proficiency 
 
11. Rate your level of experience with computers/Internet: (pick one) 
• ( ) None 
• ( ) Beginner 
• ( ) Intermediate 
• ( ) Advanced 
• ( ) Expert 
 
 11. Do you use any of the following types of computers? (check all that apply) 
a. Desktop      ____ yes ____ no 
b. Laptop      ____ yes ____ no 
c. Tablet or other portable wireless computer  ____ yes ____ no 
d. Some other type of computer   ____ yes ____ no 
 12. How many hours do you average online per day? (pick one) 
( ) 0-2 
( ) 3-4 
( ) 5-6 
( ) 7-8 




8.2. Appendix B – Interview Protocol & Observation Form 
 
1. Briefly, please introduce yourself and your role at the university. 
 
2. You were selected to participate in this interview because your email account was 
compromised in a phishing incident. Can you please share with us what you 
remember from the incident? 
 
3. Division of Information Technology records retained a copy of the phishing email 
from the incident. [Provide the message to the participant.] Please take a look and 
comment on anything else you recall from the incident. Tell me what you notice about 
this email. If you received this today, what would you notice about it? 
 
4. Do you recall how the incident was brought to your attention? Did you notice 
something wrong with your account or was someone in contact with you? Tell us 
about that, please. And, what loss, if any, did you experience as a result of the 
incident (time, data)? 
 
5. What tools, if any, do you use in your email program to filter messages, report junk 
mail, etc. to manage your inbox? 
 
6. Have you been exposed to any awareness/education efforts about phishing? Please 
share what you recall about them—content, sources in which you remember seeing 
information? 
 
7. A 2-part question:  
Following the incident, how, if at all, did your behavior change?  
Following the education effort, how, if at all, did your behavior change?  
(If the participant identifies a change, follow up with: Has the change been sustained? 
 
8. On a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being low and 7 being high, give yourself a rating on 
the level of risk you take online, and comment on why you rate yourself at that level. 
 
9. Software patches and operating system updates are provided by software 
companies to guard against exploits of vulnerabilities that could lead to a compromise 
of security or identity. Please tell us about your regularity of installing updates and 
updating your anti-virus software.  
 
10. When a friend posts a link on social media, what precautions, if any, do you 
employ when deciding whether or not to click on it?  
 
11. If someone sends you a personalized message with a link (through email, social 
media, etc.), how do you decide whether or not to open the link? Does your 
relationship with the sender matter?  
 
12. Were you familiar with the concept of social engineering before the phishing 
attack or this interview? What other attacks do you know of? 
 
13. If you had to give recommendations to your friends regarding how to avoid being 
phished, what would you tell them?  
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14. What ideas do you have about how phishing incidents could be minimized? 
 
15. What might an effective campaign to prevent phishing victimization look like? 
 
16. Are we talking about what is important to talk about? 
 





• What were the main issues or themes that struck you in the interview? 
 
• What visible displays of intensity did you see in the interviewee? (Be as 
specific as possible, if you can recall what was being talked about at the time, 
note it.) 
 
• Note anything else that struck you as salient, interesting, illuminating or 
important in the interview. 
 
• What new (or remaining) questions do you now have for the next interview or 





8.3. Appendix C – Correlation matrix between predictor and outcomes  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Extraversion 1 .245** .244** -.345** .205** -.235** 0.027 .184** 0.069 -.218** .116* -0.057 0.072 .126* .150** .151** 
Agreeableness .245** 1 .402** -.393** .291** .131* .169** -0.065 0.038 -.319** -.246** -.382** -.265** -.295** -.117* -0.008 
Conscientiousness .244** .402** 1 -.422** .211** .248** .330** -0.002 -0.088 -.573** -.245** -.353** -.272** -.298** -.245** -0.036 
Neuroticism -.345** -.393** -.422** 1 -.122* 0.076 -.158** -0.015 0.098 .381** 0.099 .123* -0.04 0.083 -0.082 -0.042 
Openness .205** .291** .211** -.122* 1 0.034 .222** 0.09 0.052 -.189** -0.09 -.231** -0.094 -.199** -0.058 .313** 
Risk-avoidance -.235** .131* .248** 0.076 0.034 1 .164** -.217** 0.011 -.108* -.422** -.388** -.430** -.610** -.750** -.291** 
Rational Decision-
Making 
0.027 .169** .330** -.158** .222** .164** 1 -0.011 .211** -.147** -.325** -.209** -.138** -.183** -0.039 .114* 
Intuitive Decision-
Making 
.184** -0.065 -0.002 -0.015 0.09 -.217** -0.011 1 .131* 0.078 .464** .128* .162** .218** .109* .147** 
Dependent 
Decision-Making 
0.069 0.038 -0.088 0.098 0.052 0.011 .211** .131* 1 .261** 0.022 .105* 0.005 0.047 0.042 -0.082 
Avoidant 
Decision-Making 
-.218** -.319** -.573** .381** -.189** -.108* -.147** 0.078 .261** 1 .304** .344** .245** .249** .157** -0.058 
Spontaneous 
Decision-Making 
.116* -.246** -.245** 0.099 -0.09 -.422** -.325** .464** 0.022 .304** 1 .427** .356** .445** .288** .132* 
Ethical Risk-
Taking 
-0.057 -.382** -.353** .123* -.231** -.388** -.209** .128* .105* .344** .427** 1 .626** .680** .393** .138** 
Financial Risk-
Taking 
0.072 -.265** -.272** -0.04 -0.094 -.430** -.138** .162** 0.005 .245** .356** .626** 1 .513** .458** .257** 
Health/Safety 
Risk-Taking 
.126* -.295** -.298** 0.083 -.199** -.610** -.183** .218** 0.047 .249** .445** .680** .513** 1 .615** .243** 
Recreational Risk-
Taking 
.150** -.117* -.245** -0.082 -0.058 -.750** -0.039 .109* 0.042 .157** .288** .393** .458** .615** 1 .319** 
Social Risk-
Taking 







.174** .105* .116* -.117* 0.024 -0.072 .168** 0.028 0.052 -.114* -0.023 0 -0.013 0.041 .154** 0.039 
Password 
Generation 
.158** .135** .284** -.260** .121* 0.014 .110* -0.047 -.144** -.319** -.107* -.154** 0.03 -.172** -0.017 .133* 
Proactive 
Awareness 
0.086 .183** .230** -.157** .225** .161** .217** -.110* -.153** -.319** -.254** -.378** -.208** -.324** -.104* 0.062 
Updating 0.036 0.048 .200** -.133* -0.014 0.096 .180** -0.011 0.079 -0.095 0.066 0.026 0.045 -0.086 -0.021 0.048 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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8.4. Appendix D – Means and standard deviations for all continuous 
predictors and outcomes  
(N=369) 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
Ethical Risk Taking 2.1385 1.101 
Financial Risk Taking 2.4947 1.11401 
Health/Safety Risk Taking 2.7466 1.25721 
Social Risk Taking 4.7529 0.9795 
Rational Decision Making 3.9912 0.57561 
Intuitive Decision Making 3.5122 0.64298 
Dependant Decision Making 3.5526 0.67649 
Avoidant Decision Making 2.6927 0.976 
Spontaneous Decision Making 2.637 0.79317 
Risk Avoidance 3.1544 0.85564 
Extraversion 3.4298 0.71444 
Agreeableness 3.9091 0.5532 
Conscientiousness 3.7065 0.68045 
Neuroticism 2.4045 0.76585 
Openness 3.9468 0.61765 
Age 31.47 15.3 
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